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Abstract
Machine learning plays a vital role in understanding threats, vulnerabilities, and security
policies. In this dissertation, two machine learning empowered approaches on improving the
security of critical cyber infrastructures and functionalities will be discussed.
The first work focuses on preventing attacks that use adversarial, active end-to-end topology inference to obtain the topology information of a target network. The topology of a
network is fundamental for building network infrastructure functionalities. In many scenarios, enterprise networks may have no desire to disclose their topology information. To this
end, we propose a Proactive T opology Obfuscation (ProTO) system that adopts a detectthen-obfuscate framework: (i) a lightweight probing behavior identification mechanism based
on machine learning is designed to detect any probing behavior, and then (ii) a topology
obfuscation design is developed to proactively delay all identified probe packets in a way
such that the attacker will obtain a structurally accurate yet fake network topology based
on the measurements of these delayed probe packets, therefore deceiving the attacker and
decreasing its appetency for future inference. We show that ProTO is very effective against
active topology inference with minimum performance disruption. Experimental results under different evaluation scenarios show that ProTO is able to (i) achieve a detection rate of
99.9% with a false alarm of 3%, (ii) effectively disrupt adversarial topology inference and
lead to the topology inferred by the attacker close to a fake topology, and (iii) result in an
overall network delay performance degradation of 1.3% - 2.0%.
In the second work, we aim to investigate the potential attacks against CSI-based user
selection algorithms, reveal the impacts of such attacks, and derive corresponding countermeasures to improve the security of MU-MIMO networks. WiFi 5/6 relies on a key feature,
Multi-User Multiple-In-Multiple-Out (MU-MIMO), to offer high-volume network throughvii

put and spectrum efficiency. MU-MIMO uses a user selection algorithm, based on each user’s
channel state information (CSI), to schedule transmission opportunities for a group of users
to maximize the service quality and efficiency. In this work, we discover that such algorithm
creates a subtle attack surface for attackers to subvert user selection in MU-MIMO, causing
severe disruptions in today’s wireless networks. We develop a system, named M U-MIMO
user selection strategy inference and subver sion (MUSTER), to systematically study the attack strategies and further to seek efficient mitigation. MUSTER is designed to include two
major modules: (i) strategy inference, which leverages a new neural group-learning strategy
named MC-grouping via combining Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) and Monte Carlo Tree
Search (MCTS) to reverse-engineer a user selection algorithm, and (ii) user selection subversion, which proactively fabricates CSI to manipulate user selection results for disruption.
Experimental evaluation shows that MUSTER achieves a high accuracy rate around 98.6%
in user selection prediction and effectively launches the attacks to disrupt the network performance. Finally, we create a Reciprocal Consistency Checking technique to defend against
the proposed attacks to secure MU-MIMO user selection.

viii

Chapter 1: Introduction

Machine learning plays a vital role in understanding threats, vulnerabilities, and security
policies. In this dissertation, two machine learning empowered approaches on improving
the security of critical cyber infrastructures and functionalities will be discussed. The first
work [1, 2] focuses on preventing attacks that use adversarial, active end-to-end topology
inference to obtain the topology information of a target network. To this end, we propose
a Proactive T opology Obfuscation (ProTO) system that adopts a detect-then-obfuscate
framework: (i) a lightweight probing behavior identification mechanism based on machine
learning is designed to detect any probing behavior, and then (ii) a topology obfuscation
design is developed to proactively delay all identified probe packets in a way such that the
attacker will obtain a structurally accurate yet fake network topology based on the measurements of these delayed probe packets, therefore deceiving the attacker and decreasing
its appetency for future inference. In the second work [3], we aim to investigate the potential attacks against CSI-based user selection algorithms, reveal the impacts of such attacks,
and derive corresponding countermeasures to improve the security of MU-MIMO networks.
We develop a system, named M U-MIMO user selection strategy inference and subver sion
(MUSTER), to systematically study the attack strategies and further to seek efficient mitigation. We create a Reciprocal Consistency Checking technique to defend against the proposed
attacks to secure MU-MIMO user selection.

1.1

Defending Against Adversarial Network Topology Inference
The topology of a network is the fundamental information for building network infrastruc-

ture functionalities, such as path routing and packet forwarding. Many network applications

1

require prior knowledge of the topology, especially for applications built on top of overlay network techniques [4], such as peer-to-peer (P2P) network, virtual personal networks
(VPN), content delivery networks (CDN) and voice over IP (VoIP, e.g., Skype) [5–7]. In
addition, network topology is the essential information required in network diagnosis and
failure localization [8–11].
However, the knowledge of network topology can advance network attackers’ malicious
objectives, leading to more precise or effective attacks. For example, attackers can leverage
topology information to craft advanced denial-of-service (DoS) attacks to concentrate on
important nodes or links in a targeted network to maximize the attack impact or even
conceal malicious activities by confusing the global system failure monitoring algorithms [12].
Therefore, it may not always be desirable or even prohibitive to disclose the internal network
topology to the outside, which is particularly important for organizational/enterprise systems
to protect commercial interests and private information.
The undesirability or prohibition of disclosing network topology does not necessarily discourage attackers from acquiring such information by adversarial, active inference. There
are mainly two types of topology inference techniques that can be used by attackers for the
malicious purpose: internally cooperative topology inference [13] and external end-to-end
topology inference (also called as tomography-based topology inference) [14]. The former
technique usually utilizes tools (e.g., traceroute or ping) and cooperates with internal nodes
to collect their corresponding response messages to infer topology (e.g., assuming internal
nodes should respond to ping). As an alternative, external end-to-end topology inference
shows the promise of discovering the topology through end-to-end path performance measurement (e.g., inferring through packet delays or loss rates on end-to-end paths) without
internal nodes’ cooperation. Studies [14–23] have shown that external end-to-end topology
inference can achieve a high accuracy rate.
For the purpose of ensuring network security, it is necessary to develop countermeasures for defending against adversarial topology inference. To combat internally cooperative
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topology inference, network administrators can simply disable internal routers’ response to
traceroute or ping [24]. Advanced designs, such as NetHide [25], can prevent topology leaking
through internally cooperative topology inference while keeping the functionalities of traceroute and ping. However, these existing techniques cannot defend against external end-to-end
topology inference, which poses a real and crucial threat to networks considering that tomography based external measurement has been supported by a number of network products
and manufacturers (e.g., Ericson [20], Cisco [21], Microsoft [22], Huawei [23]). Though these
efforts aim to prompt the convenience of network management for meritorious inference,
they can also be leveraged by malicious attackers.
In this work, we focus on mitigating the risk of topology leakage due to adversarial
external end-to-end topology inference. As an attacker can perform topology inference based
on measuring the performance of probe packets going through a target network, an intuitive
way to defense is to detect such probe packets then disable their forwarding. However,
this way usually results in that the attacker draws attention to inference failure and then
develops follow-on actions. Further, the network topology is relatively static. Once acquiring
the topology information, the attacker does not need to frequently update such information.
This indicates that the detection rate of a designed defense mechanism must be very high to
prevent the attacker from easily obtaining such information even for once. As there always
exists a tradeoff between detection rate and false alarm, a higher detection rate generally
indicates a higher false alarm. Hence, simply denying forwarding any potential probe packet
will lead to preventing a fair amount of legitimate traffic that is misidentified from going
through the network. To solve these issues, we propose a Proactive T opology Obfuscation
(ProTO) system that proactively defends against adversarial topology inference.
There exist two major modules in ProTO: (i) a probing behavior identification mechanism
designed biased towards a very high detection rate while allowing for a slight false alarm
and (ii) a topology obfuscation design proactively delaying all identified probe packets in a
way that the attacker will obtain a structurally accurate yet fake network topology based
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on the measurements of these delayed packets. ProTO aims to deceive the attacker and
decrease the possibility of further inference attempts. The system does not disrupt any
packet forwarding inside the network, but only intentionally delays malicious probe packets
identified by the identification mechanism. We implement and evaluate ProTO with various
setups over realistic network topologies. To the best of our knowledge, ProTO is the first
system designed against adversarial end-to-end topology inference. There are several key
designs and contributions in ProTO to balance security and cost.
• Identification of probing behavior: An attacker can disguise their probe packets as regular data packets going through the network, we propose a lightweight machine learning
based classifier for ProTO to identify probe packets. Through combining offline selftraining and online incremental updating, the classifier achieves a very high detection
rate of 99.9% and also has a low false alarm rate of around 3% in our experiments.
We also adopt a voting-based strategy to ensure improving the data representativeness in incremental updating, meanwhile maintaining a low computation overhead for
performance-sensitive network devices.
• Topology obfuscation: We first formulate the model for topology inference, and then
adopt a min-max approach for topology obfuscation: as the maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE) in general minimizes the topology inference error, we aim to disrupt the
topology inference of MLE used by a potential attacker. In particular, we propose the
obfuscation method to delay probe packets such that a fake topology, which is structurally correct but independent of the real topology, will be obtained by the attacker.
Experiments show that ProTO is able to effectively disrupt adversarial topology inference and lead to the topology inferred by the attacker close to the fake topology.
We also prove that an attacker gains no information of real network topology from the
fake topology.

4

• Minimum disruption of packets: If a packet is identified as a probe packet, it will be
delayed by ProTO. As the identification mechanism allows for false alarms, we must
ensure that (i) the delay performance degradation of the packet is minimized such that
a misidentified packet will have the minimum delay penalty, and at the same time
(ii) topology obfuscation is achieved. We use an optimization framework to solve the
objective. Experimental results show that ProTO leads to an overall network delay
degradation of 1.3% - 2.0%.

1.2

Securing User Selection in MU-MIMO Networks
Multi-User Multiple-In-Multiple-Out (MU-MIMO), as an essential part of WiFi 5/6, has

been widely supported in commercial wireless devices (e.g., WiFi routers/access points, mobile devices) to substantially improve the spectrum efficiency and increase the data throughput in wireless networks. MIMO indicates multiple propagation paths between the transmitter and receiver. To benefit from such spatial multiplexing, MU-MIMO allows the transmitter
to send concurrent traffic streams to multiple receivers at the same time.
In practice, a transmitter is usually equipped with a limited number of antennas (e.g., up
to 8 in WiFi 6 [26]), but the number of users can go up to tens or hundreds in MU-MIMO
networks. Considering that the transmitter can only serve a small group of users at each
data transmission session, how to select users to serve plays a crucial role to implement
MU-MIMO networks. As concurrent data streams traveling through different propagation
paths experience independent channel fading and may interfere each other, traditional user
scheduling (e.g., round-robin user selection) without consideration of channel state information (CSI) may not obtain a user group with the least inter-user interference and is not
suitable for MU-MIMO networks [27]. Recently, multiple CSI-based schemes have been proposed to achieve the optimal user selections and maximize the system throughput [28–33].
To achieve a more accurate and reliable CSI, implicit channel feedback is dropped in favor
of explicit feedback in MU-MIMO networks [34]. Specifically, downlink CSI is estimated at
5

each user and is then sent to the transmitter as the feedback for user selection. CSI is
time-sensitive and may only remain consistent for a short time period. A timely channel
feedback is critical to achieve fast and responsive communications. Research indicates that
a 200ms feedback delay will result in a 50% degradation of achievable throughput in MUMIMO networks [35]. Accordingly, CSI is required to be reported in plaintext as soon as
possible [36] (e.g., plaintext feedback in WiFi 5/6).
Nevertheless, we discover that this convenient CSI feedback mechanism actually creates
a subtle attack surface for attackers to subvert the user selection in MU-MIMO networks.
Specifically, since the CSI feedback is self-reported and is transmitted in plaintext, an attacker is able to collect and analyze users’ feedbacks, and further to delicately fabricate a
forged channel feedback to manipulate the user selection results. In this work, we aim to
investigate the potential attacks against CSI-based user selection algorithms, reveal the impacts of such attacks, and derive corresponding countermeasures to improve the security of
MU-MIMO networks.
To this end, we present a strategy, named M U-MIMO user selection strategy inference
and subver sion (MUSTER), that allows us to systematically study the potential risks of the
user selection procedure and further to seek efficient mitigation. Specifically, we find that
such a vulnerability may lead to three major categories of attacks that can essentially disrupt
the CSI-based user selection from both user fairness and system throughput, which are the
key objectives of implementing MU-MIMO networks.
• Targeted Denial of Service (TDoS): The attacker aims to starve particular users, such
that the victims can never or barely get access to the transmitter. Such attacks can
specify any victims to amplify its adverse impact, such as disconnecting important users
who provide essential services, disrupting users requesting time-sensitive accesses, or
starving local-network competitors.
• Cooperative Privilege Escalation (CPE): The attacker aims to escalate the privilege
of particular users (e.g., a conspirator), increasing their possibility of being selected
6

and obtaining exclusive service. In this way, the attacker and the conspirator can
cooperatively gain unfair access to the transmitter and abuse network operations.
• Network Throughput Degradation (NTD): One of the key objectives of user selection
algorithms is to select a user group that achieves the maximum network throughput.
By fabricating a forged CSI feedback, the attacker can subvert user selection results
and substantially degrade the target MU-MIMO network throughput.
We adopt MUSTER to examine existing CSI-based user selection algorithms by exploiting
these attacks, and reveal the potential risks. In the development of MUSTER, we meet two
essential technical challenges that must be addressed to facilitate the attacker’s purpose.
(1) Comprehending the user selection strategy in black-box settings: As not being specified in existing standards (i.e., WiFi 5/6), current practices of user selection algorithms for
MU-MIMO transmission are vendor-implementation specific [37]. These implementations
are confidential or proprietary in commercial products. Without the knowledge of how a
transmitter selects users in such black-box settings, it is difficult for the attacker to craft
the proposed attacks by scattershot approaches. To address this challenge, MUSTER introduces a design, named User Selection Strategy Inference, to proactively comprehend the user
selection strategy of a target MU-MIMO network. In particular, we design a novel neural
group-learning strategy, MC-grouping, that integrates Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) and
Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS). It jointly considers users within possible groups yet substantially reduces the search space. With MC-grouping, the attacker can accurately predict
user selection results and further subtly launch attacks.
(2) Fabricating CSI feedbacks to subvert the user selection: It is challenging to launch
the proposed attacks merely with the predicted user selection results. We don’t rely on
adversarial perturbations [38], as such attacks without taking care of MIMO spatial compatibility can destroy the orthogonality property of precoded wireless communication and
make messages not decodable at receivers. Instead, we propose an algorithm named Spatial
Compatibility Quantization to learn the inter-user correlation among the predicted selection
7

group in MUSTER. By learning the inter-user correlation among the predicted user group,
we propose detail strategies on how to delicately fabricate the CSI feedback to launch each
type of the potential attacks.
In addition to the attack strategy design, analysis, and evaluation, we develop an effective
approach, named Reciprocal Consistency Checking, to protect the user selection from been
undermined.
We implement MUSTER as a practical system and conduct experiments on real-world
MU-MIMO networks with different user selection algorithms and settings. The experimental results show that the proposed strategy inference can accurately learn the user selection
algorithm and achieve an accuracy rate up to 98.6% of user selection predictions. We also
investigate the proposed attacks on top of user selection predictions. Results shows that
TDoS can achieve up to 97.48% success rate, CPE can achieve up to 94.86% success rate,
and NTD can substantially leads to 34.7%∼ 54.3% network throughput degradation. The
experiment results indicate that MUSTER can effectively launch desired attacks. We also
study the proposed countermeasure to mitigate the discovered CSI-feedback related vulnerability. Our experiment shows that the proposed Reciprocal Consistency Checking can
achieve a detection rate of 99.32%, essentially eliminating the potential attacks.
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Chapter 2: ProTO: Proactive Topology Obfuscation Against Adversarial
Network Topology Inference

The topology of a network is fundamental for building network infrastructure functionalities. In many scenarios, enterprise networks may have no desire to disclose their topology
information. In this chapter 1 , we aim at preventing attacks that use adversarial, active
end-to-end topology inference to obtain the topology information of a target network. To
this end, we propose a Proactive T opology Obfuscation (ProTO) system that adopts a
detect-then-obfuscate framework: (i) a lightweight probing behavior identification mechanism based on machine learning is designed to detect any probing behavior, and then (ii) a
topology obfuscation design is developed to proactively delay all identified probe packets in
a way such that the attacker will obtain a structurally accurate yet fake network topology
based on the measurements of these delayed probe packets, therefore deceiving the attacker
and decreasing its appetency for future inference. We show that ProTO is very effective
against active topology inference with minimum performance disruption. Experimental results under different evaluation scenarios show that ProTO is able to (i) achieve a detection
rate of 99.9% with a false alarm of 3%, (ii) effectively disrupt adversarial topology inference
and lead to the topology inferred by the attacker close to a fake topology, and (iii) result in
an overall network delay performance degradation of 1.3% - 2.0%.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.1, we introduce the preliminaries and
related work. In Section 2.2, we introduce the models and state the research problem. In
Section 2.3, we design the probing behavior identification mechanism. In Section 2.4, we
1

This chapter was published in IEEE INFOCOM 2020 [1] and IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
2021 [2]. Copyright Permissions are included in Appendix A.
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present the strategy for network topology obfuscation. Then, we present and discuss the
experimental setups and results in Section 2.5.

2.1

Preliminaries and Related Work
In this section, we introduce the background and related work of topology inference.

2.1.1 Topology Inference
Many topology inference techniques have been proposed to infer the topology of a network. These techniques can be classified as two categories: (i) internally cooperative topology
inference and (ii) external end-to-end topology inference.
The topology discovery tools, which are developed based on internally cooperative inference, need cooperations from internal network nodes and collect their responses to probe
packets, such as traceroute or ping packets, then utilize these responses to further infer the
network topology. For example, Spring et al. developed a tool called Rocketfuel that can
successfully recover the network topology by utilizing traceroute [39]; Archipelago (Ark)
which is launched by CAIDA conducts large-scale traceroute-based topology measurements
to obtain insights into Internet infrastructures [40]. There are also several topology discovery
projects built on top of RIPE Atlas which provides Internet-wide traceroute measurement
data for researchers to use [41].
External end-to-end inference is also called tomography-based inference [14]. In external
end-to-end topology inference, a few probe nodes are placed outside a target network. Probe
packets are sent between probe nodes to pass through the target network. Then, the network
topology can be inferred based on the end-to-end measurements of probe packets. For example, [14,15,19] build different external end-to-end topology inference systems for topology
recovery with the accuracy rate up to 95%. Recently, a lot of work has been focused on improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the inference techniques, and making them more
practical [16–18] for even large-scale networks. Technology companies (e.g., Ericson [20],
10

Cisco [21], Microsoft [22], Huawei [23]) have also developed specialized devices/techniques
that can be used for external end-to-end topology inference. These efforts aim to assist network management by reducing network consumption and improving accuracy for topology
discovery.

2.1.2 Topology Related Attacks
Though these inference techniques may be utilized for network management, they can be
often leveraged by adversaries to obtain the topology of a network even when the network
has no desire to disclose such information [42,43]. As the fundamental information for packet
routing and forwarding, the knowledge of network topology can be utilized by attackers to
advance their malicious purposes, especially by geographical information related attacks.
Common examples of using topology information to advance or exacerbate attacks include
Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS), Domain Name System (DNS) poisoning, and Internet
censorship.
• DDoS: DDoS attack is a malicious attempt to disrupt the normal functionality of
a network, it aims to overflow the capacity of a target network with overwhelming
traffic [44]. With the target network’s topology information, attackers are able to
craft advanced attacks to concentrate on important nodes or links to maximize the
attack impact or even conceal malicious activities by confusing the global system failure
monitoring algorithms [12]. It has been shown in [25] that the attack’s efficiency can
be significantly increased through precisely selecting target nodes or links based on
topology information.
• DNS poisoning: The DNS is a decentralized naming system designed for network address resolution [45]. DNS poisoning can divert network traffic away from legitimate
targets and towards fake ones [46, 47]. Many attacks can be launched on top of DNS
poisoning, such as man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack, blind packet injection and net-
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work phishing [48, 49]. With the knowledge of a victim network’s topology, attackers
can spoof the DNS address lookup database in a more accurate way. Furthermore,
considering that DNS servers are organized as a hierarchy network, if attackers can infer the topology of the DNS server network, the poisoning’s successful rate and impact
can be maximized [50, 51].
• Internet censorship: Censorship opposites the philosophy that the Internet is born
free, it surveils and controls network communications which include content considered
as sensitive or harmful [52]. The information of network topology can be used by
censorship to facilitate restrictions on Internet access. A specific censorship policy
may pursue targeting on particular points (e.g., sensitive users) in the network. With
the assistance of topology information, the censorship system can accurately identify
the target points in the network, therefore to emphatically monitor them [53]. The
system can also improve the performance by selecting critical network locations as
censor points based on topology information [54, 55].

2.1.3 Defenses against Malicious Inference
To defend against internally cooperative topology inference, the simplest way is to prohibit inference by disabling any internal node’s response to traceroute or ping. However,
traceroute or ping based network functionalities will also be disabled in the meantime. In
addition, existing studies proposed many specified topology protection techniques [25,56–58].
For example, [56] proposed a deception technique that can prevent adversaries from getting
the true topology of a network. The technique mainly utilizes the inherent weaknesses of
traceroute packets (i.e., lacking authenticity and integrity) to mislead the attackers to get a
wrong topology. The work in [57] proposed a system called RDS that can deceive attackers to
camouflage critical resources in the network. More recently, an obfuscation tool NetHide [25]
is proposed to obfuscate topologies by modifying traceroute packets in the data plane.
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However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no systematic tool developed to combat
malicious external end-to-end topology inference. This type of inference does not rely on
ping or traceroute and thus makes existing defense designs focused on internally cooperative
topology inference ineffective to protect network topology information. Because attackers can
perform external inference by sending probe packets going through the network in addition
to other legitimate data traffic, it is non-trivial to develop a mechanism that can mitigate
the risk of leaking topology information. Therefore, in this paper, we focus on developing a
system to defend against external topology inference for a target network.

2.2

Models and Research Scope
In this section, we present models, introduce the research problem, and present an

overview of the ProTO system.

2.2.1 Network and Attack Models
We consider a network connected to a larger network system (e.g., the Internet). The
nodes inside the network are cooperating with routing/forwarding of packets traveling through
the network. There exists an attacker that has no prior knowledge of the network topology
but aims to infer the topology information. To this end, the attacker can place or use nodes
outside the target network to launch an external end-to-end topology inference.
External end-to-end topology inference follows a tree structure for packet probing and
topology recovering, in which the attacker uses one source and a set of receivers R =
{1, 2, · · · , R} (R is the number of receivers) outside the network to infer the network topology. As an example shown on the left-hand side of Figure 2.1, let T = (V, L) denote the
topology tree of the target network with node set V and link set L. The attacker’s source
s is connected to the root of the tree, and each receiver has a path to one leaf of the tree.
A link with its endpoints, which is neither the root or a leaf node, is called an internal link
in T . Tree structure based topology inference is widely adopted to obtain a real network
13
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Figure 2.1: An example for malicious topology inference.
topology [59]. More complicated topologies (e.g., mesh networking) can be also obtained by
constructing multiple trees with different root nodes [59], these include topologies only with
acyclic parts and topologies with cyclic parts or multigraph parts [14–19, 59–62]. Though
there are still limitations for external end-to-end topology inference, how to ameliorate the
inference technique is not the primary research goal of this work.
In malicious topology inference, the attacker sends probe packets from source s, which
pass through different paths inside the network to receivers R to obtain end-to-end path
measurement results, such as packet loss rate or packet delay. In this paper, we use the delay
metric as the measurement metric as it is the most widely-used one in topology inferences.
The design intuition of topology inference is that when packets are forwarded from the
source to the receivers, they may go through shared links inside the network before they
split and reach different receivers; therefore, the network topology fundamentally affects
the correlations of delays observed at different receivers. In particular, denote by xi,j the
correlation delay for a pair of receivers i and j (i, j ∈ R), and xi,j is the sum of the delays on
all shared links between the end-to-end path from the source to receivers i and the end-to-end
path from the source to receiver j (e.g., the link between nodes a and b is only the shared
link between source to receiver 1 and source to receiver 2 in Figure 2.1). Approaches [14–19]
have been developed and used by the attacker to compute correlation delays {xi,j }i,j∈R and
based on which the complete network topology can be recovered.
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As Figure 2.1 shows, when there is no protection deployed, the attacker is able to recover
the topology Ttrue . Note that a non-branching node (i.e., node with less than two child nodes)
is not identifiable in topology inference [19]. Thus, the recovered topology tree is a logical
tree, which consists of branching nodes of the real topology and the logical links between
them. For example, nodes c and g are merged as node 3 in the recovered logical tree Ttrue
in Figure 2.1.

2.2.2 Design Objectives
It is essential to develop effective countermeasures to mitigate the risk of topology leakage
due to external end-to-end topology inference. Traditionally, a potential way for designing
countermeasures [63–65] is to first identify possible probe packets then disable them (e.g.,
via banning the prober’s IP address). However, the topology information of a network is
relatively static information, and a network does not frequently change its network topology
configuration. This means that an attacker can always try to send probe packets from time to
time to obtain such information. The information is obtained as long as the attacker succeeds
for once inference. Moreover, disabling misidentified legitimate traffic may significantly
degrade the network performance or even influence the network functionalities. Hence, the
effectiveness of this detect-then-disable approach solely relies on the complete accuracy of
identifying malicious behavior, which is quite challenging.
Our perspective is that instead of designing completely accurate identification and disabling probe packets from any identified source, we can relieve the burden of identification and proactively delay (potentially malicious) packets going through the target network.
Therefore, we adopt a detect-then-obfuscate strategy. Specifically, we need a probing behavior identification algorithm that can be (even coarsely) designed biased towards a very high
detection rate but allows for a slight or moderate false alarm rate: any malicious probing
behavior can be identified and some legitimate traffic may also be misidentified. When a
source is identified as a potential prober, we do not drop all of its packets, but proactively
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delay its packet forwarding with minimum disruption to prevent topology inference. In this
way, a small amount of legitimate traffic under false alarm can also go through the network
with minimum performance degradation.
Through proactively delaying malicious probe packets, network administrators do not
need to suppress malicious topology inference by disabling the external end-to-end measurement, but can deliver a structurally accurate yet fake topology to the attacker. Thus, the
design deceives the attacker and decreases the possibility of further inference attempts. We
design a practical system ProTO that adopts this proactive topology obfuscation strategy
to combat malicious inference and ensure the confidentiality of network topology.
There exist major challenges in developing ProTO: (i) how to create a biased identification
towards the detection rate while still maintaining an allowable false alarm rate? (ii) how to
make sure an attacker can indeed recover a fake, invertible topology? (iii) delaying packets
inside the network inevitably leads to performance loss, how to balance the security and the
network performance?

2.2.3 Overview of ProTO System Design
We develop the ProTO system for a target network to achieve the design objectives.
Figure 2.2 shows the system architecture of ProTO, which consists of two major modules:
(i) identification and manipulation module and (ii) topology control module.
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Figure 2.2: The system architecture of ProTO.
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• Identification and Manipulation Module: this module first identifies the probe packets
and then manipulates their forwarding delay inside the network according to the topology obfuscation specified by the topology control module. In Section 2.3, we propose
a lightweight machine learning based method to classify probe packets, which ensures
a very high detection rate and also tolerates a low false alarm rate.
• Topology Control Module: the module provides a uniform control interface for network
administrators to manage the ProTO system. It generates obfuscated topologies and
associated packet delay manipulation criteria as the outputs to the identification and
manipulation module to delay identified probe packets. In Section 2.4, we formulate
the topology obfuscation strategy that intentionally delays identified probe packets
such that an attacker using topology inference only obtains a structurally correct yet
fake topology, which is independent of the real network topology.

2.3

Probe Packet Identification
As discussed in Section 2.2.3, the identification and manipulation module in ProTO aims

to remove the burden of ensuring complete accuracy and design a probing identification
mechanism biased towards a very high detection rate. This indicates that (i) a very high
detection rate means any malicious probing behavior should be identified; (ii) it unavoidably
leads to a number of false alarms (because there is always a trade-off between detections and
false alarms). Although legitimate traffic that is misidentified may be intentionally delayed,
ProTO ensures that the overall network performance loss is very limited according to the
topology obfuscation mechanism offered in Section 2.4.
Identifying probe packets for topology inference is essentially a data classification problem. In this section, we propose a machine learning based framework for efficient classification. We first summarize the packet features we extract for classification, then present and
discuss the proposed method.
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2.3.1 Extracting Features
It is non-trivial to identify malicious probe packets from network traffic, as an attacker
may try to disguise the probe packets as regular data (TCP/UDP) packets going through
the network. In addition, if an attacker is aware of our detection, it can try to camouflage
its packets to evade the packet characteristics based detection. By investigating existing
external end-to-end inference methods [14–23] and analyzing patterns of probe packets, we
notice characteristics associated with probe packets for topology inference that are different
from normal data packets and can be potentially used for identification.
• In external end-to-end inference, the network topology is recovered by measuring the
correlation delays among different pairs of receivers as discussed in Section 2.2.1.
Specifically, in calculating the correlation delay between a pair of receivers, the probe
packets are grouped and sent to both receivers in a pair. All the packets for a pair of
receivers have the same source address, while the destination addresses belong to one
of the two receivers.
• The two groups of probe packets for a receiver pair always go along the same path
inside the network from the source until they reach a branching node, from which they
are directed to different receivers.
• In order to recover the topology consisting of all nodes in the network, the total number
of receiver pairs should be large. Furthermore, a pair of receivers needs to be measured
for hundreds or even thousands of times to obtain a mean delay value to remove random
measurement noise [14, 15, 19]. Hence, the network should observe a high-volume of
traffic with the same patterns. Normally, the interval of two probe packets usually
are tens of milliseconds [14–19]. Therefore, for a general network with hundreds to
thousands receiver pairs, the traffic with the same patterns will last for minutes to
hours in external end-to-end inference.
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These observations show that the key differences between probe packets and normal
data packets are not only the characteristics of a single packet, but also the correlation
relationships among different packets. These correlation relationships reflect the holistic
transmission patterns of probe packets in external end-to-end inference. Unless not using
external end-to-end inference, these holistic patterns cannot be evaded even if the attacker
actively disguises its probe packets. As a result, it is still possible to identify a group of
probe packets based on their characteristics. ProTO leverages a lightweight machine learning
framework to identify probe packets for real-time operations.
Different from previous traffic identification studies [66–70] that usually extract hundreds
of features for machined learning based identification, ProTO carefully shrinks the parameter
space by selecting a limited number (36 by default and also customizable) of features which
are related to the above observations. These 36 features are selected through pre-training. In
particular, we first obtain weights for all features listed in [67] by adopting a weight training
algorithm (see Section 2.3.3 for details). Then, we select the top N weighted features from
them to further train the labeled data and compare the evaluation results for different values
of N. We define a metric Performance Gain to show the evaluation results for different
selected N features.

Performance Gain =

(Ac − Ap )/Ac − (Pc − Pp )/Pc
.
(Pc − Pp )/Pc

where Ac and Ap represent the accurate rate for current and previous N values, respectively;
and Pc and Pp are the computation overheads for current and previous values of N, respectively. Specifically, the computation overhead is defined as the training time on the initial
training dataset. A positive Performance Gain indicates that the accuracy grows faster than
the computation overhead with the increase of number of selected features. Another benefit
of pre-training is to reduce the communication overhead caused by transmitting the collected
features, because the feature space is shrank by this procedure. The evaluation results in
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Figure 2.3 show we can get perpetual positive Performance Gain with the increase of N until
it reaches 36. Our subsequent experimental results also demonstrate that the identification
scheme with 36 features can achieve a detection rate as high as 99.9%, at the same time
maintain a low false alarm of 3%. ProTO is capable of capturing the differences between

Performance Gain

probe and normal packets, meanwhile ensures real-time processing of these features.

When N < 36, Performance Gain > 0
When N > 36, Performance Gain < 0

0

-1

36

The number (N) of features selected

Figure 2.3: Performance Gain for different N.
A combination of these features can represent holistic transmission patterns caused by
topology inference. We list 6 features in Table 2.1 as examples to show the features selected
for identification. For example, the source address, destination address, the transit path and
several statistic features (e.g., count1 and count2 in Table 2.1) for a series of packets together
can form a basic pattern in our design observations. Next, we discuss how to continue to
optimize different weights to these features to improve the overall detection rate during the
training and identification.
Table 2.1: Examples of the features used in identification.
Feature Name
Source address
Destination address
Transit path
Time interval
Count1
Count2

Description
IP address
IP address
Series of internal link indices
Time interval to the previous packet
Number of packets with the same size
of header bytes in a time window
Number of packets with the same size
of control bytes in a time window
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2.3.2 Identification Model
The identification model is designed as an incremental semi-supervised learning framework [71,72], which is suitable for the scenarios with limited amount of labeled data. Before
the deployment of ProTO, the system first performs a self-training phase to collect the initial training data, including the packets labeled as either probe or non-probe packets. This
training dataset is then used to build the semi-supervised classifier. When ProTO is online,
it continues to collect packets as non-labeled data. Then, feature data extracted from these
collected packets becomes testing data that will be classified by the initial classifier and be
added to the training set to incrementally improve the classification performance.
Though the network traffic may vary greatly over different time, the key features of the
probe packets indeed remain consistent. As discussed in Section IV-A, the temporal and
spatial correlations among probe packets are quite unique compared to common network
traffic. Specifically, for each topology inference all probe packets will follow similar packet
setting, travel through correlated router, and end up to different pairs of receivers. Also,
probe packets are usually aggregated in groups (e.g., hundreds or thousands of packets) and
transmitted in a constant time interval, to eliminate random measurement noise. In that
way, the network should be able to capture a burst of traffic with the same patterns (e.g.,
consecutive packet interval, path correlation, consistency of start and end nodes, deviation
of header and control message setting), when the attacker actively infers the network. As
such holistic patterns are inherently existing in external end-to-end inference, they cannot
be evaded even if the attacker intentionally disguises its probe packets. In addition, the
identification model also adopts online incremental training mechanism that keeps learning
the traffic pattern to further refine the decision boundary after the system is online. Particularly, the classifier will be incrementally updated and maintain a dynamic dataset pool
keeping packets that can better characterize the probe and normal ones. In that way, the
classifier is updated in a timely manner to accommodate varying network traffic over time.
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Traditionally, k-NN is widely used in traffic classification, and it shows good performance
in identifying specific traffic flow. The characters of k-NN are 1) It calculates the distances
between each training sample and the target packet, and then selects the k-nearest samples to
the target packet. These k samples jointly determine the class of the target packet. 2) More
importantly, the distance of two packets, which is calculated based on multiple features, is the
direct means for expressing the similarity of packets. While in probe packet identification,
the key challenge is to capture the holistic transmission pattern, which is determined by
multiple packets along with multiple features of each packet. Therefore, k-NN is well-suited
for detecting probe packets.
We develop a lightweight k-Nearest Neighbor (light-k-NN) approach to identify probe
packets. Different to traditional k-NN, light-k-NN is more suitable for our use case by
adopting two designs: 1) a multi-round dynamic method to adaptively train the weights for
different features is designed. This method continuously tunes the weights with the increase
of data size when the system is online. 2) a voting-based lazy-learning update strategy is
implemented. Under this strategy, the incremental update of the data pool indeed increases
the representativeness. At the same time, it maintains the data pool in a limited size, such
that the performance and space overhead does not increase. We present the two design details
in Sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4, respectively. In this way, light-k-NN is as easy as traditional k-NN
to be used, but is more suitable for ProTO for real-time network devices.
Central to light-k-NN is the notion of distance between packets. In particular, the distance D(P, P 0 ) between two packets P and P 0 is calculated by computing the distance between
their numerical feature vectors, i.e.,

D(P, P 0 ) =

X

wn |fn (P) − fn (P 0 )|,

(2.1)

1≤n≤F

where fn (P) and fn (P 0 ) denote the n-th entries of the feature vectors of packets P and P 0 ,
respectively; F is the number of features used for packet classification; and wn is the weight
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of the n-th feature. Under light-k-NN, if a packet is close to k packets which include more
packets identified as probe packets previously, it will be classified as a probe packet.
The vector W = [w1 , w2 , ..., wF ] includes the weights for all features in computing the
distances between packets. These weights are computed initially from the training dataset
in the self-training phase and fine-tuned during the online operation.

2.3.3 Training the Weights
In comparison to traditional k-NN classifiers which assign either no weight or static
weights to different features [73–75], light-k-NN adopts a multi-round dynamic method to
adaptively tune the weights online. In particular, we first initialize all weights as W0 =
{1, 1, ..., 1}, then follow (2.1) to calculate their k-NN distances and classify all the packets
in training dataset as either probe or normal. Denote by Sprobe or Snormal as the sets that
contain probe packets and normal packets, respectively. When ProTO is online and starts
to monitor packets, we use a two-step training procedure to tune the weights for different
features.
In step 1, we orient to examining the correctness and usefulness for each feature in
the calculation of k-NN distance following the current weight set. The objective for this
examination is to check if a feature is less-weighted or over-weighted in the calculation.
Specifically, for each packet P ∈ Sprobe , we choose m packets in Sprobe closest to P to form a
set S1 and m packets in Snormal closest to P to form a set S2 . Then, define the per-feature
distance for feature n ∈ [1, F ] between P and P 0 ∈ S1 as
Dn (P, P 0 ) = |fn (P) − fn (P 0 )|,

(2.2)

and compute the set of all per-feature distances {Dn (P, P 0 )}P 0 ∈S1 . Let dmax and dmean be
the maximum and mean values of the set, respectively. Then, for feature n, compute all
per-feature distances between packet P and P 00 ∈ S2 to obtain {Dn (P, P 00 )}P 00 ∈S2 , in which
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the number of per-feature distances larger than dmax is denoted by C1 (P, n) and the number
of per-feature distances smaller than dmean is denoted by C2 (P, n). Finally, we compute the
P
P
sum C1 (n) = P∈Sprobe C1 (P, n) and the sum C2 (n) = P∈Sprobe C2 (P, n), respectively. The
details of this procedure are shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Quantifying the over-weighted or less-weighted degree for each feature per iteration.
Input : Sprobe : the set of probe packets in the training dataset.
Snormal : the set of normal packets in the training dataset.
Output: C1 (n): the quantified less-weighted degree for feature n.
C2 (n): the quantified over-weighted degree for feature n.
1 foreach packet P ∈ Sprobe do
/* Calculate the less-weighted and over-weighted degree of each feature for a packet P in Sprobe .
*/
2
3
4
5
6

S1 = P’s m closest packets in Sprobe ;
S2 = P’s m closest packets in Snormal ;
foreach feature f ∈ [1, F ] do
foreach packet P 0 ∈ Sprobe do
Dn (P, P 0 ) = |fn (P) − fn (P 0 )|;

7

dmax = max{Dn (P, P 0 )}P 0 ∈Sprobe ;

8

dmean = mean{Dn (P, P 0 )}P 0 ∈Sprobe ;

/* dmax is the maximum per-feature distance
/* dmean is the mean per-feature distance
9
10
11
12
13

14

16
17

*/

foreach packet P 00 ∈ Snormal do
if Dn (P, P 00 ) > dmax then
C1 (P, n) = C1 (P, n) + 1;
if Dn (P, P 00 ) < dmean then
C2 (P, n) = C2 (P, n) + 1;
foreach feature n ∈ [1, F ] do
/* Calculate the over-weighted and less-weighted degree of each feature overall all packets of
Sprobe .

15

*/

*/

foreach packet P ∈ Sprobe do
C1 (n) = C1 (n) + C1 (P, n);
C2 (n) = C2 (n) + C2 (P, n);

Step 2 aims to optimize the calculated k-NN distances by adjusting the weight for each
feature based on the results of step 1. A large value of C1 (n) indicates feature n is useful
for identifying probe packets and should be given more weight. By contrast, a large value
of C2 (n) indicates that packet P ∈ Sprobe has a small per-feature distance to normal packets,
thus feature n is not an evident feature to differentiate the probe packet from normal packets
and should be less-weighted. Accordingly, we adjust the weights for different features in each
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iteration following Algorithm 2 as an online tuning algorithm. For each packet arrival, we
compare C1 (n) with C2 (n) for each feature n, and adjust the value of its weight wn by
∆wn = (C1 (n) − C2 (n))q/(m|Sprobe |), where the step q is set to be 0.01 by default. The
value of q is the step/unit adopted in weight adjustment. A larger value of q will lead to a
coarse-grained but faster adjustment in weight training, while a small value of q will result
in a fine-grained but slower adjustment. We choose a medium number of 0.01 as the default
value to achieve a balance between accuracy and performance in weight training. In ProTO,
q can be customized by the network operator based on their deployment settings. Its value
can be further tuned according to the training speed and model accuracy observed.
Algorithm 2: Adjusting the weights for different features per iteration.
Input : C1 (n): indicates whether feature n should be more-weighted.
C2 (n): indicates whether feature n should be less-weighted.
1 foreach feature n ∈ [1, F ] do
/* Adjust the weight for each feature.
2
3

*/

∆wn = (C1 (n) − C2 (n))q/(m ∗ |Sprobe |);
wn = wn + ∆wn ;

2.3.4 Incrementally Updating Training
Since the initial training dataset collected from self-training before the deployment of the
ProTO system is limited, incrementally updating the training dataset by adding the new
classified data can improve the light-k-NN based classifier when the system is online.
However, increasing the size of training dataset will also lead to a computational burden
and space overhead, we develop a method that can ensure light-k-NN improves the accuracy
incrementally, while also limiting the training size. In particular, we implement a voting
system to maintain a data pool for the active training dataset, which contains two classes:
probe or normal. The system maintains an upper bound of the number of packets for each
class. When an incoming packet P is classified into a class C ∈ {probe, normal}, the vote
count of each packet will be incremented by 1 if the packet belongs to the k nearest packets
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closest to P and is in the training dataset of class C as well. These packets are considered
useful for classification.
The new packet P will be then added into the training dataset of class C and assigned
a vote number with the least vote count in class C plus one. If the number of packets in
class C is greater than the upper bound, the packet with the least votes will be removed
from the training dataset of class C . The details of this strategy are shown in Algorithm 3.
It can be expected that through this voting system, the decision boundary will be refined
and become more precise, and packets that are less important to the classification will be
gradually removed to limit the training dataset size. For a newly added packet, its number
of votes is initialized as the average number of votes of all other packets in its class.
Algorithm 3: Incrementally updating the training dataset following the voting-based strategy.
Input : Pin : the incoming packet.
Sprobe : the set of probe packets in the training dataset.
Snormal : the set of normal packets in the training dataset.
Sk : the set of the k packets closest to Pin .
1 if Pin is probe packet then
/* Adjust the set of probe packets.
2
3
4

Vmin = min{Vote(P)}P∈Sprobe ;
/* Vmin is the minimum vote # in Sprobe .

5

7
8
9

12
13

Vmin = min{Vote(P)}P∈Snormal ;

16
17
18

*/

Vavg = avg {Vote(P)}P∈Snormal ;
/* Vavg is the average vote # in Snormal .

15

*/

foreach packet P ∈ Sk and P ∈ Snormal do
Vote(P) = Vote(P) + 1;
/* Vmin is the minimum vote # in Snormal .

14

*/

else
/* Adjust the set of normal packets.

11

*/

Sprobe = Sprobe + Pin ;
Vote(Pin ) = Vavg ;
if |Sprobe | > upper bound then
Sprobe = Sprobe − PVmin ;
/* PVmin is the packet with the minimum vote count in Sprobe .

10

*/

Vavg = avg {Vote(P)}P∈Sprobe ;
/* Vavg is the average vote # in Sprobe .

6

*/

foreach packet P ∈ Sk and P ∈ Sprobe do
Vote(P) = Vote(P) + 1;

*/

Snormal = Snormal + Pin ;
Vote(Pin ) = Vavg ;
if |Snormal | > upper bound then
Snormal = Snormal − PVmin ;
/* PVmin is the packet with the minimum vote count in Snormal .

*/
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2.3.5 Discussions about Most Relevant Features
For features used in training and tuning, we adopt multiple approaches (e.g., Euclidean
distance, Hamming distance, exclusive or) to quantify their distances between two packets.
All the feature distances will be weighed and added together. As described before, the
weight for each feature is tuned through training to indicate their significance such that all
features are properly interleaved to represent the holistic pattern. We found in our evaluation
that the eight most weighted features are transit path, numbers of packets with the same
(header/control/data) bytes, time interval, source address, destination address, and packet
size. We set a time window to help characterize the inter-packet features (i.e., features
reflecting correlations among different packets). Time window is empirically set as 1 min in
our evaluation. In end-to-end topology inference, each pair of receivers will be measured for
hundreds or even thousands of times in a short time period. The probe packets are highly
correlated and have the similar features. Inspired by that, when computing the distance
of an inter-packet feature between two packets, how frequently the packets with the same
feature value appear is also considered. In particular, we count the number of packets of
which the feature value is the same in the time window and use the multiplicative inverse
of the count as the weight to multiply the feature distance. For probe packets, we should
observe a larger count and get a smaller feature distance.
We use two examples to show how we map inter-packet features into numerical representations and how the time window helps identify probe packets. 1) Transit path: We denote
the transit path of each packet as a link vector L = [l1 , l2 , ..., lL ], where li is the i th internal
link of the network; li is set as 1 when the packet travels through the link, and 0 otherwise.
The distance between two transit paths is measured as the Hamming distance. For example,
the Hamming distance between paths [1, 1, 1, 1, 0] and [1, 1, 1, 0, 0] is 1. We further count the
number of packets that have the same transit path within the time window. When computing the distance between two paths, the results will be weighed by the multiplicative inverse
of the count. 2) Source (destination) address: It is represented as a 4-element vector and the
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distance is measured as the result of exclusive-or between two addresses. Given two address
vectors [192, 168, 10, 2] and [192, 168, 10, 1], their distance vector is thus [0, 0, 0, 3]. In this
example, the first three elements in distance vector are 0, indicating these two addresses are
very close to each other, and may reside in the same subnet. Similarly, we count the packets
that have the same source (destination) in the time window and weigh the address distance
accordingly.

2.4

Topology Obfuscation
In this section, we design the topology obfuscation technique for the topology control

module in ProTO to i) ensure the attacker only obtains a fake topology and ii) limit the cost
of network efficiency. We first formulate topology inference, then present proactive topology
obfuscation.

2.4.1 Inference Formulation
We first formulate the external end-to-end topology inference as a fundamental mathematical model. As discussed in Section 2.2.1, the goal of the attacker is to obtain the
topology tree of the target network by sending probe packets going through the network and
measuring the correlation delays {xi,j }i,j∈R . The set of all possible topology trees is denoted
as F, and we call F a forest. We denote the delay on link l ∈ L as µl . Then, the relationship
between correlation delays {xi,j }i,j∈R , the real topology T , and the link delays {µl }l∈L can
be formulated in a linear way as
x = Aµ,

(2.3)

where x = [x1,2 , x1,3 , · · · x1,R , x2,3 , x2,4 , · · · , x2,R , · · · , xR−1,R ]T (the operator ·T denotes the matrix
transpose) (i.e., x is obtained by stacking all elements in {xi,j } into a column vector); the
vector µ = [µ1 , µ2 , · · · , µL ]T with L being the number of internal links in the network; and
A = [ak,m ] is called the routing matrix, which depends on the topology T . In particular,
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element ak,m in A has value 1 if the m-th link of the network is shared by the receiver pair
corresponding to the k-th element in x, and value 0 otherwise.
We use a simple example to demonstrate how the routing matrix is determined. As
shown in Figure 2.4, there are 6 receivers and thus the number of different receiver pairs is

6
= 15. In tree T , the link set is {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. The routing matrix A = [ak,m ] is therefore
2
a 15-by-5 matrix with 1 ≤ k ≤ 15 and 1 ≤ m ≤ 5. In particular, ak,m is 1 if the m-th link is
a shared link for the k-th receiver pairs. For example in Figure 2.4, the pair of receivers 1
and 2 (which share link 1 on their paths) corresponds to x1 , therefore a1,1 = 1.
Based on (2.3), we write the probability density of x as p(x|A, µ). The likelihood function
of T can be written as
b
L(x|T ) ≡ p(x|A, µ),

(2.4)

b is the maximum likelihood estimate of µ given T . The MLE obtains the topology
where µ
Tb that maximizes the likelihood by

Tb ≡ arg max L(x|T ).

(2.5)

T ∈F

The calculated Tb is the desired topology of the target network in external end-to-end topology inference.
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Figure 2.4: An example: routing matrix A of tree T .
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2.4.2 Topology Obfuscation
Topology obfuscation aims to camouflage the attackers by misleading them to recover
a fake topology in the inference. From the formation of inference, it is obvious that the
network can manipulate the path measurement results to achieve this goal. Intuitively, we
should achieve the best obfuscation effort by maximizing the difference between the recovered
topology and the real topology. However, if the attacker is aware of the defender’s goal (e.g.,
maximizing the difference), the attacker may try to reverse the real topology from recovered
topology via finding the topology that has the maximum difference.
A successful topology obfuscation strategy should deliver a non-reversible fake topology
and avoid the aforementioned situation. From the mathematical perspective, a randomly
generated Am will maximize the difficulty to recover the real topology. We present a theoretical analysis for random generation of fake topology in Section 2.4.3. In particular, we
randomly generate a fake topology denoted by Am independent of the real topology A in
(2.3). Then, we intentionally affect the probe packets going through the network to influence the path measurement results of an attacker such that it obtains Am instead of A from
topology inference. To this end, theoretically, based on the underlying formulation (2.3) for
topology inference, we multiply by a manipulation matrix F both sides in (2.3) and obtain

Fx = FAµ,

(2.6)

where the left-hand side Fx represents the manipulated measurement results observed by the
attacker. In order for the attacker to obtain the fake topology Am based on the observation
Fx using MLE. The following linear equation must hold

Fx = FAµ = Am µ.

(2.7)
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Therefore, our goal of topology obfuscation is to find the manipulation matrix F such that

FA = Am ,

(2.8)

given the real topology A and the fake one Am .
Note that (2.8) is obtained based on the assumption that the attacker will use MLE
to estimate the topology. The MLE generally minimizes the estimation error in statistical
inference [76]. Thus, obfuscation based on (2.8) can be considered as a min-max strategy to
disrupt the best performance that can be obtained by the attacker.

2.4.3 Fake Topology Generation and Security Analysis
To successfully deliver a non-reversible fake topology, the control module in ProTO randomly generates the fake matrix Am once the system is deployed. We develop a random
generation algorithm to get a structurally correct yet fake topology Am that is independent
of A. Specifically, suppose A is an m-by-n matrix, ProTO keeps generating an m-by-n matrix with all elements randomly selected from {0, 1} until the generated matrix represents
a connected tree structure. Then, ProTO uses the generated matrix as Am for topology
obfuscation. In case the attacker may notice the obfuscation efforts, ProTO will keep the
generated Am as the target fake topology for a certain time so the attacker will always obtain
the same topology even with multiple inferences.
We analyze the information security of the proposed random fake topology generation.
The successful topology obfuscation strategy should ensure the attacker cannot derive the
real routing matrix A even with the knowledge of the randomly generated matrix Am .
Mathematically, we analyze the security in the form of entropy, which denotes the average
uncertainty of the topology to the attacker. For the attacker without the initial knowledge of
the matrix A, A can be treated as a random matrix, and we denote it as B from the attacker’s
P
perspective. Its entropy is defined as H(B) = − b∈B PB (b) log PB (b), where PB (b) is the
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probability when B = b, b is a specific topology matrix. Similarly, the entropy of B condiP
tioned on the attacker knowing Am is defined as H(B|Am ) = am ∈Am PAm (am )H(B|Am = am ),
where PAm (am ) is the probability when Am = am . Due to the independence between Am and
B, H(B|Am = am ) = H(B) and thus H(B|Am ) = H(B), which indicates the knowledge of Am
gives the attacker no information of real routing matrix B.

2.4.4 Optimization Based Topology Obfuscation
After Am is generated, the topology control module computes the manipulation matrix
F based on (2.8). It is worth noting that the topology matrix A is an m-by-n matrix with
m > n. Thus, there will be infinite solutions for F in (2.8). As a result, we need to find the
best solution to (2.8).
First, not all solutions can be practical in real-world systems. As Fx represents the path
measurement delays observed by the attacker, Fx should have comparable values to the
original measurement x. Thus, we should impose a constraint in searching for F such that

any element in Fx − x is within [0, δmax ],

(2.9)

where δmax is called the maximum allowed deviation for the delay. Note that d should not
be less than 0 because obfuscation efforts may not be able to decrease the packet delay due
to the physical constraint of the network system, but it is feasible to intentionally increase
the packet delay to manipulate the path measurements through the network.
Then, we transfer the problem of finding F such that FA = Am given (2.9) into the
following optimization problem.

minimize
F

subject to

kFA − Am k2 ,

(2.10)

any element in Fx − x is within [0, δmax ].
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There exists a tradeoff if choosing the value of δmax for topology obfuscation: a large value
can increase the network performance overhead; and a small value may decrease the effectiveness of the obfuscation efforts as the search range in the optimization (2.10) is limited.
For the default setting, we choose the maximum value occurred for each path in normal
measurements as default δmax .
2.4.5 Obtaining Manipulation Matrix F
In (2.10), the manipulation matrix F to be found is an m-by-m matrix, A and Am are
m-by-n matrices, representing the real topology and the fake topology, respectively. To solve
(2.10), we first write F = {fi,j }, A = {ap,q } and Am = {b
ap,q }. Let ai = [a1i , a2i , ..., ami ] and
f = [f11 , ..., f1m , ..., fm1 , ..., fmm ]T , then it holds that

kFA − Am k2 = kMf − mk2 ,

(2.11)

where M is an m × n by m × m matrix satisfying M = [C, ..., C]T ; C = diag(a1 , a2 , ..., am );
and m is a column vector with m2 elements with the k-th element mk in m being âp,q in Am ,
 
where p = kn and q = k − pn. Let H = diag(xT , xT , ..., xT ), we rewrite (2.10) as
minimize
f

subject to

f T MT Mf − 2mMf

(2.12)

0 ≤ Hf ≤ xmax ,

where xmax denotes the maximum allowed delays for all links after obfuscation, each of whose
elements is set to be the normal link delay in the network plus δmax . Thus, solving (2.10)
is equivalent to solving (2.12). In our case of network obfuscation, MT M in (2.12) is a
semi-definite matrix.
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2.4.6 Proactively Delaying Probe Packets
After probe packets are identified and the manipulation matrix F is calculated, the topology control module sends F to the identification and manipulation module for delay manipulation of probe packets. Specifically, ProTO first calculates the truth correlation delay for
each pair of receivers based on the current link performance metrics in its network. Then,
it computes the difference between the true correlation delay and the desired correlation
delay based on the manipulation matrix F. Finally, ProTO delays a probe packet by the
time difference between the two correlation delays. In our implementation, ProTO intercepts
identified probe packets at the exit nodes of the network, holds them in a special waiting
queue after the intended delay, and then sends them out. As aforementioned, the light-k-NN
identification framework in ProTO is designed biased towards a very high detection rate,
while allowing false alarms. Such a design ensures obfuscating the topology by delaying all
probe packets at the cost of a slight network performance degradation for wrongly identified
normal data packets.

2.5

System Implementation and Evaluation
In this section, we use different network scenarios based on real world topologies to

evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed ProTO system. We first present
the implementation of ProTO and setups of the evaluation testbed. Then, we evaluate
the effectiveness of the proposed probe packet identification algorithm (i.e., light-k-NN) in
the identification and manipulation module. Finally, we provide and discuss the overall
performance against adversarial topology inference by successful topology obfuscation.

2.5.1 Implementation and Experimental Setups
ProTO is implemented in P4 [77] integrated with Python. P4 is a domain-specific language (DSL) for programming the data plane of network forwarding devices (e.g., switches
and routers). In our design, the P4 program mainly focuses on packet processing related
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tasks, including packet capturing, feature extracting and packet manipulation (i.e., delaying
the packets). While the algorithms used to generate the fake topology Am and compute
the manipulation matrix F are written in Python. The P4-based implementation for packet
processing is hardware independent (i.e., requiring no knowledge of hardware during development) and can be compiled according to hardware specifications into realistic devices.

Switch

Claranet

Cogent

Figure 2.5: Structures of three collected topologies.
We use three real-world network topologies from Internet Topology Zoo [78] in the evaluation, including a small, a medium and a large network with information listed in Table 2.2
and topologies shown in Figure 2.5. We create these three networks on two high-performance
computing workstations (each has dual Intel Xeon Gold 5122 3.70 GHz CPUs and 192 GB
Memory) connected through 10 Gigabit Ethernet. Each network node is created as an independent virtual machine that runs OpenWrt [79] as the operating system. OpenWrt is an
open source Linux based operating system that can work as routing management system.
The advantage of choosing OpenWrt is that it can compatibly execute P4-based code.
Table 2.2: Statistics of three collected network topologies.

Nodes
Links

Claranet

Switch

15
18

42
63

Cogent
197
243

As the most recognized external end-to-end topology inference techniques, we adopt the
methods proposed in [14–19] to carry out the evaluation. Specifically, we follow the tree
structure to perform the external end-to-end topology inference. For each topology, we first
identify all the end nodes (i.e., nodes connected to the network with only one link) and the
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end circles (i.e., circles connected to the network with only one link). In the evaluation, each
end circle will be treated as an end node. In inference, we use one of the end nodes as the
source node and others as the receiver nodes. Internal circles are ignored in our evaluation,
we simply consider these circles as branch paths from the source node to the receiver nodes.
Meanwhile, we collect various types of data packets by running different network applications,
including web browsing, file transfer, online chatting, and video streaming on a local-area
network, and replay these data packets as the background network traffic in our experimental
network. In this way, we simulate a realistic use scenario in which probe packets are mixed
with regular data packets going through a target network. We also tune the amount of
background traffic to measure the performance in different network traffic conditions. For
the low utilization condition, the background loads for different links range from 5% to 50%,
with an overall load of 30%; for the high utilization condition, the loads for different links
range from 10% to 90%, with an overall of 45%.

2.5.2 Performance of Probe Packet Detection
To evaluate the probe packet detection performance of the proposed light-k-NN classifier,
we first define two performance metrics (i.e., detection rate and false alarm rate); then we
use these metrics to quantitatively examine if our light-k-NN design can achieve the design
goal of guaranteeing the confidentiality of network topology by ensuring the enforcement of
our detect-then-obfuscate strategy.

2.5.2.1

Performance Metrics

We evaluate the identification performance of the proposed light-k-NN classifier from
two perspectives: 1) the detection rate, which is defined as the number of probe packets
correctly identified divided by the total number of probe packets, i.e., detection rate =
# of correctly identified probe packets
,
total # of probe packets

and 2) the false alarm rate, defined as the number of normal
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packets misidentified as probe packets divided by the total number of all normal packets,
i.e., false alarm rate =

# of misidentified normal packets
.
total # of normal packets

The detection rate measures the percentage of correctly identified probe packets among
all probe packets. According to our detect-then-obfuscate (i.e., proactively delay) approach,
the detection rate should be high to ensure the confidentiality of network topology. While the
false alarm rate measures the amount of normal packets that are wrongly identified as probe
packet. These wrongly identified packets will also be delayed by ProTO. The delay should
not affect the network functionalities but allow for slight performance degradation. Hence,
ProTO should reduce the false alarm rate as low as possible in probe packet detection.
Table 2.3: Detection performance for different sizes of initial training dataset and updating
scales.
Topology

Claranet

Size of Initial
Training
Dataset
500
1000
2000
3000
500

Switch

1000
2000
3000
500

Cogent

1000
2000
3000

Incremental Updating Scale During Online Training
No Updating
1.0
1.5
2.0
D=0.922
F=0.143
D=0.960
F=0.095
D=0.985
F=0.040
D=0.991
F=0.038
D=0.922
F=0.143
D=0.960
F=0.095
D=0.985
F=0.040
D=0.990
F=0.039
D=0.920
F=0.144
D=0.959
F=0.097
D=0.984
F=0.041
D=0.989
F=0.039

D=0.945
F=0.114
D=0.976
F=0.076
D=0.993
F=0.035
D=0.997
F=0.034
D=0.945
F=0.115
D=0.975
F=0.077
D=0.993
F=0.035
D=0.997
F=0.034
D=0.943
F=0.116
D=0.974
F=0.077
D=0.992
F=0.037
D=0.995
F=0.036

D=0.961
F=0.096
D=0.985
F=0.053
D=0.997
F=0.034
D=0.998
F=0.030
D=0.960
F=0.086
D=0.984
F=0.054
D=0.996
F=0.034
D=0.997
F=0.031
D=0.960
F=0.088
D=0.983
F=0.054
D=0.995
F=0.035
D=0.997
F=0.033

D=0.978
F=0.087
D=0.992
F=0.042
D=0.999
F=0.030
D=0.999
F=0.028
D=0.977
F=0.078
D=0.991
F=0.043
D=0.999
F=0.030
D=0.998
F=0.028
D=0.976
F=0.078
D=0.990
F=0.044
D=0.999
F=0.033
D=0.998
F=0.030

2.5
D=0.982
F=0.079
D=0.993
F=0.035
D=0.999
F=0.028
D=0.999
F=0.026
D=0.981
F=0.070
D=0.992
F=0.036
D=0.999
F=0.028
D=0.999
F=0.026
D=0.980
F=0.070
D=0.992
F=0.037
D=0.999
F=0.030
D=0.998
F=0.028

1D

= detection rate, F = false alarm rate.
Size of Initial Training Dataset indicates the number of data points for both probe packets and normal packets in the
initial training dataset.
3 The Incremental Updating Scale indicates the scale of active training dataset (compared with the initial training dataset)
during online training. For example, scale = 1.0 means the packets in training dataset will be updated during online training,
but the total number of packets will keep the same with the initial dataset. While No Updating indicates the training dataset
will not be updated during online training.
2 The
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2.5.2.2

Detection Performance

The performance of the proposed light-k-NN classifier to detect probe packets is evaluated
on the three networks. We find that the evaluation results in terms of detection and false
alarm rates are nearly the same under low and high utilization conditions. Table 2.3 shows
the evaluation results under the high network utilization condition. In the experiments, the
size of the initial training dataset is chosen to be 500, 1000, 2000, and 3000. As discussed
in Section 2.3.4, ProTO incrementally increases the training size until an upper bound is
reached. The incremental updating scale is defined as the ratio between the upper bound
and the initial training size. In our experiments, the scale is selected from [1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5]
and we also evaluate the case of no online training updating as shown in Table 2.3.
• Impact of initial training dataset: We can observe in Table 2.3 that the size of initial training has a substantial impact on the detection performance of the light-k-NN
classifier. Specifically, when the size increases from 500 to 2000, the detection rate increases substantially in all scenarios (i.e., in different networks with different updating
scales). For example, the detection rate improves from 94.5% to 99.7% in Claranet
with updating scale of 1.0. At the same time, the false alarm rate also decreases (e.g.,
the rate decreases from 11.4% to 3.4% in Claranet with updating scale of 1.0).
• Impact of incremental updating: It is seen in Table 2.3 that the increase of the updating
scale will lead to performance improvement of the classifier. For example, in Claranet,
when there is no online updating, the classifier with the initial training size of 500
has a detection rate of 92.2% and a false alarm rate of 14.4%; when the classifier
incrementally updates its training and sets the updating scale to be 2, the detection
rate is improved to 97.8% and the false alarm rate is reduced to 9.8%. Overall, when
the updating scale becomes 2.5, the classifier achieves a detection rate of 98.0% – 99.9%
and a false alarm rate of 2.6% – 7.9% in the three network scenarios.
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• Detection rate and false alarm rate over time: Based on the evaluation results in
Table 2.3, we set the size of the initial training dataset to 2000 and the updating scale
to 2 for follow-on experiments. The setups achieve a good balance between the probing
detection performance and the computational complexity incurred by the detection.
Figure 2.6 shows the detection rate achieved by the light-k-NN classifier as the number
of probe packets sent to ProTO. As we can see from the figure, when the ProTo is online
and the attacker starts to send probe packets, the detection rate is gradually improved
over time, reaching 99.9% in all three network scenarios. Figure 2.6 also shows the
ratio of the online training size to the initial training size during incremental online
updating in ProTO. The figure shows that the ratio increases linearly and eventually
reaches the updating scale 2.0.
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Figure 2.6: Detection rate for probe packet identification.
Figure 2.7 shows the false alarm rate and the ratio of the online training size to the initial
training size, as functions of the number of normal packets sent to ProTO. In the figure, we
can see that as ProTO gradually processes more incoming normal packets, the false alarm
rate continues to drop and eventually remains stable at around 3% for all three network
scenarios. Figures 2.6 and 2.7 show that ProTO achieves a detection rate of 99.9% and a
false alarm rate of around 3% when it processes a sufficient number of packets.
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Figure 2.7: False alarm rate for probe packet identification.
2.5.3 Evaluation of Topology Obfuscation
After identification of probe packets, the objective of ProTO is to intentionally delay these
packets in the network such that the attacker can only obtain a fake topology by using end-toend topology inference. To evaluate the effectiveness of the topology obfuscation in ProTO,
we conduct experiments on the three network scenarios for two cases: (i) no defense is used to
combat topology inference and (ii) ProTO is activated to obfuscate probe packets. For each
network scenario, we run the experiment 100 times with randomly generated topologies and
average the results under cases (i) and (ii) to evaluate the effectiveness and cost of ProTO.

2.5.3.1

Effectiveness Metrics

As ProTO aims to mislead the attacker to obtain a fake topology, it is essential to
measure the difference between the real topology and the fake one that the attack obtains.
In evaluation, the logical topologies of the three real-world networks are calculated and
further comparison results are all obtained based on the logical topologies. A popular metric
to measure the difference between two trees is the Tree Edit Distance (TED) defined in [80].
TED calculates the difference between two trees T1 and tree T2 as a set of pre-defined editing
operations by which tree T1 can be mapped/transformed to tree T2 . For instance, there are
R replacements, I insertions, and D deletions for the mapping from tree T1 to tree T2 , then
the cost for the operations in this mapping can be calculated by TED=cr R+ci I +cd D, where
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cr , ci , and cd are the costs of a replacement, an insertion, and a deletion, respectively. In
our evaluation, we adopt the unit cost for each operation, i.e., cr = ci = cd = 1 .
To make the evaluation more intuitive, we define a similarity score within [0, 1] based
on TED. Given T1 and T2 , we first compute their TED as TED0 , then calculate the TED
between T1 and a zero-node tree, denoted by TED1 (which can be considered as the cost
needed to remove everything in T1 ) as well as the TED between T2 and a zero-node tree,
denoted by TED2 (which can be considered as the cost needed to construct T2 from scratch).
Then, the similarity score is defined as

similarity score = 1 −

TED0
.
TED1 + TED2

The similarity score is 1 if T1 = T2 , and has a smaller value if T1 is more evidently different
from T2 . We define the benchmark score as the average similarity score between the real
network topology and a randomly generated topology, and obtain using simulations that the
benchmark score is 0.6. Hence, we consider ProTO to be effective if the similarity score
between the real topology and the inferred topology is close to 0.6.

2.5.3.2

Evaluating Effectiveness of Topology Obfuscation

We first consider case (i) in which there is no defense for the networks. Figure 2.8 shows
the similarity score between the real topology and the inferred topology, as a function of the
number of probe packets (the minimum number is 100) sent along each path between the
source and a receiver under topology inference. It is observed in Figure 2.8 that if no defense
deployed, the attacker can easily obtain the real topology with high accuracy. For example,
if the attacker sends 10000 probe packets for each path between the source and a receiver,
it is able to recover the topology with a similar score close to 1.
We then consider case (ii) in which ProTO is deployed. Figure 2.9 depicts the similarity
score between the real topology (under ProTO’s protection) and the inferred topology, as
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Figure 2.8: Similarity score between the inferred topology and the real topology without
protection.
a function of the number of probe packets sent along each path between the source and a
receiver. The figure shows that the similarity score between the real topology and the inferred
topology is significantly reduced to around the benchmark score of 0.6. This indicates that
the inferred topology under ProTO has little difference from a random topology and therefore
ProTO is effective against topology inference.
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Figure 2.9: Similarity score between the inferred topology and the real topology under
protection.
We further analyze the similarity score between the inferred topology and the fake topology Am that is generated according to Section 2.4.3 in ProTO’s control module to evaluate
the difference between the intended topology by ProTO and the inferred topology by the
attacker, which is shown in Figure 2.10. We can find in Figure 2.10 that overall, the optimiza-
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tion based topology obfuscation in (2.10) delivers an intended topology with high accuracy
to the attacker.
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Figure 2.10: Similarity score between the inferred topology and the intended topology.

2.5.3.3

Performance Cost of Topology Obfuscation

ProTO unavoidably introduces the network performance cost by delaying normal packets
going through the network that are misidentified as probe packets. In particular, from the
network perspective, delaying probe not normal packets has no substantial impact on the
network performance, as they are of malicious intent and do not carry any data. However,
when a normal packet has been falsely identified as a probe one, delaying it may potentially
degrade the data delivery efficiency. We aim to measure the performance degradation due
to false alarm and intentional delaying. We define the performance cost as the ratio of the
extra delay incurred by ProTO to the original delay for a normal packet going through the
network. Specifically, for a misidentified packet, its original delay is measured as the traversal
time of the packet going through the network without the intentional delay introduced by
ProTO. In our experiment, we measure the original delay before enforcing additional delay
at exit nodes. Therefore the original delay can be measured as the duration between the
time instant that the packet enters the entry node and the time instant that the packet
is processed at the exit node before intentionally delayed. For each of the three network
scenarios, we measure (i) the performance cost of normal packets that are misidentified as
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probe packets and delayed by ProTO and (ii) the overall performance cost of all normal
packets (that are either correctly identified or misidentified) going through the network.
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Figure 2.11: The performance cost of normal packets misidentified by ProTO.
Figure 2.11 shows the box plot of performance cost in case (i) in which only misidentified
normal packets are measured. The box plot shows the distribution of performance cost of
misidentified packets, including the minimum, the maximum, the median, the average, the
first quartile and the third quartile. From Figure 2.11, we observe that ProTO increases the
delay of a misidentified normal packet by 31% - 37% on average under the low utilization
condition, and by 39% - 45% on average under the high utilization condition. Meanwhile,
we note that there is no substantial change of packet drop rate, because ProTO just delays
without actively dropping packets to obfuscate the measurement results.
Table 2.4: Overall performance cost for all normal packets.
Low Utilization
Claranet
Switch
Cogent

1.28%
1.33%
1.35%

High Utilization
1.93%
1.95%
1.99%

As only a limited number of normal packets can be misidentified by ProTO (e.g., 3% false
alarm rate shown in Figure 2.7), the overall performance disruption is expected to be small
for legitimate traffic. Table 2.4 shows the performance cost in case (ii) in which all normal
packets going through the network are measured to compute the overall performance cost.
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Specifically, the overall performance cost is defined as

P

i∈Cmis

P
P
di / j∈C tj , where i∈Cmis di

denotes the summation of additional delays of all misidentified normal packets (Cmis is the
P
set of misidentified packets); and j∈C tj is the summation of the original delays of all normal packets including non-misidentified and misidentified packets (C is the set of all normal
packets and Cmis ⊂ C). The metric demonstrates the impact of additional delay introduced
by misidentified packets over all normal packets. The results are shown in Table 2.4. Since
only 3% normal packets have been misidentified, the overall performance cost due to the
deployment of ProTO is around 1.3% and 2% for the low and high utilization conditions,
respectively. We note that a number of existing studies [81–85] produced related network security designs with overheads ranging from 5% to 12%. Comparing with them, our proposed
technique can be considered efficient.
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Chapter 3: Securing User Selection in MU-MIMO Networks

WiFi 5/6 relies on a key feature, Multi-User Multiple-In-Multiple-Out (MU-MIMO),
to offer high-volume network throughput and spectrum efficiency. MU-MIMO uses a user
selection algorithm, based on each user’s channel state information (CSI), to schedule transmission opportunities for a group of users to maximize the service quality and efficiency. In
this chapter 2 , we discover that such algorithm creates a subtle attack surface for attackers to subvert user selection in MU-MIMO, causing severe disruptions in today’s wireless
networks. We develop a system, named M U-MIMO user selection strategy inference and
subver sion (MUSTER), to systematically study the attack strategies and further to seek efficient mitigation. MUSTER is designed to include two major modules: (i) strategy inference,
which leverages a new neural group-learning strategy named MC-grouping via combining Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) and Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) to reverse-engineer
a user selection algorithm, and (ii) user selection subversion, which proactively fabricates
CSI to manipulate user selection results for disruption. Experimental evaluation shows that
MUSTER achieves a high accuracy rate around 98.6% in user selection prediction and effectively launches the attacks to disrupt the network performance. Finally, we create a
Reciprocal Consistency Checking technique to defend against the proposed attacks to secure
MU-MIMO user selection.
This chapter is organized as follows. We first introduce the preliminaries and network
models in Section 3.1. In Section 3.2, we provide an overview of the proposed MUSTER
system. In Section 3.3, we design the machine learning empowered strategy inference in
MUSTER to reverse-engineer a target user selection algorithm. In Section 3.4, we study the
2

This chapter was accepted to IEEE INFOCOM 2022 [3]. The paper is in production, the copyright
statement will be similar to other IEEE publications.
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attack strategies that can compromise the user selection. We present and discuss the experimental setups and results in Section 3.5. Then we design countermeasures in Section ??and
summarize the literature related to this chapter in Section 3.7.

3.1

Preliminaries and Models
In this section, we briefly introduce the basic knowledge of MU-MIMO technique and the

general user selection strategy.

3.1.1 Network Models
We consider a downlink MU-MIMO network with one base station transmitting to K
users. The base station is equipped with N antennas and each user has one antenna. We
denote the CSI vector between user i and the transmitter as hi =[hi1 , hi2 , ..., hiN ], where hij
indicates the CSI between user i and the transmitter’s j th antenna. Assume K > N and a
group of N users will be selected for the downlink MU-MIMO transmission.
In the MU-MIMO network, precoding needs to be applied at the base station to ensure
that signals received at each user can be decoded independently. We focus on the widely
used linear precoding strategy, zero-forcing beamforming (ZF-BF), which is adopted by WiFi
5/6. ZF-BF can eliminate the multi-user interference, thus allowing data to be decoded
individually at each user.
Assume N users have been selected for ZF-BF. Denote the channel matrix of selected users
as H = [hT1 , hT2 , ..., hTN ]T (operator ·T denotes the matrix transpose). Denote the transmit
physical-layer symbols over N antennas as m = [m1 , m2 , ..., mN ]T with unit power. Then,
the received signal vector of ZF-BF can be expressed as y = HWPm + n, where W is
the precoding matrix, P is the power loading diagonal matrix, and n is the channel noise
vector. Let wi = [wi1 , wi2 , · · · , wiN ]T denote the beamforming weight vector for user i. The
precoding matrix is thus denoted as [w1 , w2 , · · · , wN ].
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√
The received signal for selected user i after precoding can be written as yi = hi wi pi mi +
P
√
√
j6=i hi wj pj mj + ni , where the first term hi wi pi mi is the desired signal, the second term
P
√
j6=i hi wj pj mj is the interference from concurrent signals, and the last term ni is the
noise. The corresponding Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise Ratio (SINR) at user i can be
represented as SINRi =

P

|hi wi |2 pi
2,
2
j6=i |hi wj | pj +δi

where δi2 is the channel noise power. In ZF-BF,

given all CSI feedbacks, the base station knows H and constructs the precoding matrix W
√
as HT (HHT )−1 , such that the interference hi wj pj mj is close to zero in practice and only
√
hi wi pi mi remains at the receiver to be decoded.
Figure 3.1 presents an example of ZF-BF in a 2 × 2 MU-MIMO system: the precoded
√
message w1 p1 m1 is orthogonal to the channel h2 , resulting in no interference to the receiver
√
√
Rx2 (i.e., h2 w1 p1 m1 = 0). Meanwhile, m1 is decodable at receiver Rx1 (i.e. h1 w1 p1 m1 =
√
√
|h1 ||w1 p1 |m1 cos θ, where θ is the angle between h1 and w1 p1 m1 in the vector space).
Intuitively, when channel h1 is orthogonal to h2 , h1 p1 m1 = |h1 ||p1 |m1 , which can yield the
largest SINR. By contrast, when h1 is aligned to h2 , h1 p1 m1 = 0, and no message can be
decoded.
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Figure 3.1: An example of ZF-BF in a 2 × 2 MU-MIMO system.

Therefore, channel spatial compatibility, which reflects how well users’ channels are orthogonal to each other [86], is a key feature to find a user group that yields the maximum
system throughput. Specifically, users whose channels are spatially compatible to each other
should be selected together to maximize the data throughput of the system.
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3.1.2 User Selection Strategy
User selection for MU-MIMO is generally formulated as a sum rate (i.e., network throughput) maximization problem with varying constraints (e.g., bandwidth limitation, fairness)
[87]. Let K = {1, 2, · · · , K } denote the set of all users. The primary goal of the base
station is to find a user set C (C ⊂ K) to maximize the total sum rate of the system (i.e.,
P
max
max i∈C log(1+SINRi ), where W and P denote the precoding weights and power

C⊂K,1≤|C|≤N W,P

allocations.). The optimal strategy is to apply the brute-force exhaustive search over all possible user sets and find the one that yields the maximum data throughput. However, the cost
of exhaustive search is exponentially expensive. Multiple greedy search based or heuristic
schemes have been proposed to achieve the near-optimum yet efficient user selection [28–32].

3.2

Overview of MUSTER
In this section, we describe the discovered CSI feedback vulnerability and the overview

of MUSTER.
Since explicit CSI feedback is used in today’s MU-MIMO networks, a malicious user is
able to report a fabricated CSI to the base station. This opens a door for exploiting the
user selection algorithm at the base station to serve its malicious purposes. We classify
such attacks into three categories: 1) Targeted Denial of Service; 2) Cooperative Privilege
Escalation; 3) Network Throughput Degradation.
It is nontrivial to achieve each of the above attacks, because the attacker has no knowledge
of the user selection algorithm and settings used in the network. In a MU-MIMO network, the
user selection algorithm is vendor-dependent and proprietary (e.g., most commercial WiFi
drivers are closed-source). Though the underlying principle of all user selection algorithms
is to resolve the aggregated sum rate maximization, their implementations may be different
to balance the performance and cost. It is necessary for the attacker to know the specific
user selection algorithm in advance.
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Intuitively, the attacker can adopt approaches of adversarial machine learning [88] to
learn the inner structure of the target algorithm and create adversarial perturbations to
subvert the user selection results. Due to the broadcast nature and open-text protocol, all
CSI feedbacks are broadcast to the wireless channel. An attacker can decode them and treat
them as the inputs for the black-box user selection algorithm. At the same time, the attacker
can also observe which users have been selected in the open channel and treat the results as
the outputs. Accordingly, the attacker can learn the input-output relationship to establish
a substitute model for the user selection algorithm and further launch attacks.
Nevertheless, a closer examination shows that approaches initiated by existing wireless
adversarial machine learning [89, 90] cannot be readily adapted to comprehend and attack
the user selection algorithm in MU-MIMO networks:
(1) The decision rules of existing approaches are usually binary, e.g., spoofing or no spoofing, jamming or no jamming. However, the possible outputs of user selection algorithms grow
exponentially when the number of users increase. It is time-consuming or even computationally infeasible to enumerate all possible groups and portray their boundaries for a target user
selection algorithm. Meanwhile, traditional machine learning usually treats each instance as
an independent entity, they may not be able to capture the inter-user correlation.
(2) Creating adversarial perturbations is a computationally intensive tasks especially for
a model with complicated decision boundaries, which is not feasible for the MU-MIMO
network requiring prompt feedback. Further, adversarial perturbations without taking care
of MIMO spatial compatibility can destroy the orthogonality property of precoded wireless
communication and make messages not decodable at receivers, leading to an anomaly that
can be easily detected.
These become the underlying motivation for us to derive a new way to subvert the user
selection. Specifically, we propose MUSTER to address the above two issues. As shown in
Figure 3.2, MUSTER consists of two major modules: (i) user selection strategy inference
that allows the attacker to build a deep learning model with accurate prediction of user
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Figure 3.2: The architecture of MUSTER.
selection; (ii) user selection subversion that enables the attacker to effectively fabricate CSI
feedbacks to achieve its malicious objectives. We introduce the technical details of modules
(i) and (ii) in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, respectively.

3.3

User Selection Strategy Inference
In this section, we design the strategy inference in MUSTER to reverse-engineer a target

user selection algorithm.

3.3.1 Problem Statement
We denote the target user selection algorithm as M. The inputs of M are all K users’
CSI feedbacks denoted as H = {h1 , h2 , ..., hK }, and other factors (e.g., bandwidth limitation, power allocation, utilization frequency) denoted as F = {f1 , f2 , ..., fK }, where fk is the
vector of other factors for user k. The corresponding output is the selected user group
G = (a1 , a2 , ...aN ), where N < K and an is the index of user n. The goal of strategy inference
is to develop a deep-learning architecture, adapted to the input-output relation of the target
black-box model M, such that producing the same selection results for the same user inputs.
As discussed in Section 3.2, existing models used in wireless adversarial machine learning
cannot be readily adapted to learn the MU-MIMO user selection algorithms. Intuitively,
we can develop a group-based learning architecture to learn the user selection algorithms.
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Rather than treating a user as an independent entity, we can construct a model that examines all possible groups. However, such a trivial approach still incurs a considerable amount
of computational overhead as it works in a brute-force manner. For a MU-MIMO network

with N transmit antennas and K users, there are KN possible groups in total. Assume the
computational complexity for examining each group is O(N), the overall computational over!
), which significantly impedes the prediction efficiency especially
head would be O(N (K K−N)!

when K is large.
To solve this, we aim to develop a new neural group-learning strategy that can jointly
consider users within possible groups yet substantially reduce the search space.

3.3.2 A New Neural Group-learning Strategy
We observe that existing MU-MIMO user selection algorithms are usually statistical
and heuristic, where users are selected step by step (e.g., only one user is selected at each
step) [28–32]. It well maps to the property of Markov Decision Process (MDP). Inspired by
that, we formulate the user selection procedure as an MDP. As shown in Figure 3.3, it starts
with an empty group. At each level of the tree, it makes a decision and selects one user into
the group until it reaches a leaf node. Each trajectory from the root to the leaf is a possible
selection group.
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Figure 3.3: User selection procedure as an MDP.
Nevertheless, it still face two challenges to apply MDP in user selection strategy inference:
1) In MDP, the decision on user to be selected next is only dependent on current step but
is conditionally independent of all previous steps. However, the entire history of selected
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users needs to be considered to understand how inter-user correlations are used in the target
user selection algorithm. 2) The MDP simplifies the user group prediction using decision
policy but does not necessarily reduce the searching space of the model training. It is timeconsuming to traverse all possible trajectories and train the model in a brute-force manner.
To this end, we develop a new neural learning strategy on the top of MDP, named MCgrouping. It combines a deep Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) [91] and Monte Carlo Tree
Search (MCTS) [92] to jointly model users selected in a group to learn the decision policy,
yet substantially reducing the search space of training. In particular, MC-grouping consists
of two components: 1) RNN encoder: it utilizes an RNN architecture to encode the whole
selection procedure (i.e., possible selected group and corresponding user inputs) into vector
representations, such that selected users will be examined altogether. 2) MCTS based model
training: it incorporates MCTS with RNN to expand the tree search with users that can
yield promising rewards only, thereby reducing the search space of the possible groups.

3.3.3 MC-Grouping Design
In what follows, we present detailed designs of RNN encoding and MCTS based model
training.

3.3.3.1

MDP Modeling

Mathematically, an MDP can be defined by a tuple (S, A, P, R), where S is the set of
states, A is the set of actions, P is the state transition probability, and R is the reward
function. In particular, as user selection is the core part of our strategy, A is specifically
defined as the set of user candidates that can be selected in each level. Let si ∈ S denote the
selection state at level i. Note that the entire history of selected users are required to learn
the inter-user correlations, we thus define si as

si = qi−1 ∪ {ak,i , hak,i , fak,i , Ki+1 , Ei+1 },

(3.1)
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where qi−1 is defined as the traversed history of previous selected users, ak,i is the user
selected at level i, hak,i and fak,i are the inputs of CSI feedback and other factors of user ak,i ,
Ki+1 is the set of user candidates in the next level, and Ei+1 is the corresponding input of
candidates (i.e., Ei+1 = {Hi+1 , Fi+1 }). si includes all essential information to describe current
state of the selection procedure, 1) all current selected users along with their CSI feedbacks
and other factors, 2) user candidates in next level. The selection terminates when it reaches
the leaf node and outputs users of the entire trajectory as the predicted user group. We
define the reward as +1 when the output includes the same selected users as the training
data and 0 otherwise.
We further define the decision policy πθ (ak |si ) as the probability of selecting user ak given
the the state si and Q function Qθ (ak |si ) as the long term reward of taking user ak given state
si , where θ is a set of model parameters. The objective of the MDP is to learn a decision
policy πθ (ak |si ) and long-term reward Qθ (ak |si ) that maximize the terminal rewards, i.e., to
correctly identify the trajectory that contains the same selected user group as the target
algorithm.

3.3.3.2

RNN Encoding

We create an RNN encoder, Gsi = Genθ (si ) to map the selection procedure into vector
representations. θ is a set of RNN parameters (i.e., θ = {θU , θG , θQ , θS }) as shown in Figure 3.4. We further rewrite si in (3.1) as, si = qi ∪ {Ki+1 , Ei+1 }. Accordingly, si consists of
two parts, 1) {Ki+1 , Ei+1 }, which indicates user candidates to be selected in the next level;
2) qi , which indicates the selection history and includes all selected users. We encode both
components respectively.
• Encoding candidate: As shown in Figure 3.4, we apply two concatenated fully connected layers to encode the whole candidates. The first layer fθU is to encode each
candidate ak0 in Ki+1 . Specifically, the vector representation Hak0 ,i+1 of user ak0 is described as fθU (ak0 , ha0k , fa0k ). With the parameter set θU , we can learn how CSI feed54

back and other factors are weighted to characterize one candidate in the target algorithm. The second layer fθG is to summarize all the candidates in si , denoted as
GK ,i+1 = fθG (Ua10 ,i+1 , ..., UaK0 ,i+1 ).
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Figure 3.4: RNN encoding.

• Encoding selection history: qi can be defined as a recursive function, qi = qi−1 ∪
{ai , hai , fai }. We then use RNN to encode the selection history into vector representation. As shown in Figure 3.4, qi+1 is encoded as Rqi+1 = fθQ (Rqi , Hai ,i , GK ,i+1 ),
where θQ is the model parameter, and Hai ,i is the vector representation of selected user
ai . Finally, we apply another fully connected layer fθS to map Rqi+1 into the vector
representation, VS,i+1 = fθS (Rqi+1 ), where θS is the parameter of the layer.
The decision policy πθ and Q-function Qθ are jointly modeled by the inner product
between VS,i+1 and Hak0 ,i+1 .
3.3.3.3

MCTS Based Model Training

MCTS is a heuristic search algorithm introduced for computer Go (e.g., Google’s AlphaGo) [93]. It can narrow down the search to the high probability selections, while still
making close to optimal decisions at each step. We combine MCTS with RNN to train the
parameter set θ (i.e., θU , θG , θQ , θS ).
θ is updated in a policy iteration procedure. First, we run multiple MCTS simulations.
Each simulation starts from the root state and iteratively selects users until it reaches the
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leaf node. In MC-grouping, we follow the upper confidence bound principle [94] to simulate
the searching trajectory. After multiple simulations, we obtain an improved search policy
that prefers users with larger accumulated rewards. Next, we learn from the the improved
policy and update the parameter set θ to maximize the similarity between the improved
policy and raw decision policy πθ . As the improved search policy does not follow the original
decision policy, θ is updated in an off-policy manner via Q-learning. We iteratively update
θ until MC-Grouping can accurately predict the selected group via the policy πθ .
3.4

User Selection Subversion
With MC-Grouping, MUSTER can accurately predict the user group who would be

selected by the base station. However, how to efficiently launch attacks that can compromise
the user selection results is still unclear. In this section, we aim to address this challenge.
As discussed in Section 3.2, adversarial perturbations are not feasible to subvert the
user selection in MU-MIMO networks. MUSTER develops new attack strategies by learning
the spatial compatibility within the predicted user group. In what follows, we denote the
predicted group as S = {s1 , s2 , ..., sN }, where si is the index of the selected user. The malicious
user is denoted as sa .
3.4.1 Targeted Denial of Service (TDoS)
In TDoS, the malicious user attempts to starve a particular user such that the victim
can never or barely get service from the base station.

3.4.1.1

Attack Overview

Assume the targeted victim is user sv (sv ∈ S). The malicious user aims to fabricate a
forged CSI feedback, such that it will be selected and replace the victim in the selected user
group. Intuitively, the malicious user may simply fabricate a forged channel feedback ha as
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the proportional amplification of the victim’s channel hv (i.e., ha = ahv and |a| > 1). In this
way, ha is aligned with the victim’s channel hv and has a larger channel gain.
Nevertheless, such a naive attack strategy may not always work. An increasing channel
gain also indicates a stronger inter-user interference. The victim may still be selected because
of the smaller interference. Further, different users should experience uncorrelated channels.
It is impossible that channels at two users always align to each other [95]. The base station
can easily detect such an attack if the attacker always feeds back an aligned channel with
the victim’s.
We design a practical attack strategy that can effectively starve a particular user. The
strategy follows two principles: (1) The fabricated channel should have a larger channel gain
but at the same time maintain a smaller inter-user interference; (2) The fabricated channel
should impose the least impact on the user selection results (i.e., only the victim will be
replaced in the selected user group). To this end, we first design an algorithm that can
identify user’s effective channel which is spatially compatible with others. Based on the
victim’s effective channel, the malicious user then fabricates a channel feedback that has a
higher spatial compatibility within the select group and replace the victim.

3.4.1.2

Spatial Compatibility Quantization

The algorithm is designed to learn the inter-user correlation within the referred selected
group and quantify users’ effective channel. The algorithm takes each user’s CSI feedback in
the predicted selected group S as input, quantifies their spatial compatibility and decomposes
each channel as effective and interference parts. The detail design of spatial compatibility
quantization is described in Algorithm 4. Note that the algorithm can be easily extended to
the scenario when other factors (e.g., fairness scheduling) are considered.
At shown, each user’s channel h(sn ) , sn ∈ S is decomposed as two parts, g(sn ) and e(sn ) =
i−1
P h(sn ) gj∗ gj
,
||gj ||2
j=1

where g(sn ) is orthogonal with other users and is considered as the effective channel
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Algorithm 4:

Spatial compatibility quantization

1. Initially, let S0 = S, S0 = ∅ and i = 1.
2. For each user sn in S0 , we first calculate the component g(sn ) that is orthogonal with all users
in S0 ,
i−1
X
h(sn ) gj∗ gj
.
g(sn ) = h(sn ) −
||gj ||2
j=1

Note that when i = 1, g(sn ) = h(sn ) .
3. Quantify the channel indexed by sˆn . Specifically,
sˆn = arg max0 ||g(sn ) ||; gi = g(sˆn ) ;
sn ∈S

ei =

i−1 h
X
g∗ gj
(sˆ
n) j
j=1

||gj ||2

; S0 = S0 + {sˆn };

S0 = S0 − {sˆn }; i = i + 1.
If S0 6= ∅, then go to Step 2. Otherwise, algorithm stopes.

of the user, and e(sn ) indicates the inter-user interference. The algorithm consumes vey
limited computational resource as it only examine users within the selected group.

3.4.1.3

Attack Design

We apply spatial compatibility quantization algorithm over the referred select group
vP
−1
hv gi∗ gi
, where gv is the
S and decompose the target victim’s channel hv as hv = gv +
||gi ||2
i=1

effective channel of the victim, and

vP
−1
i=1

hv gi∗ gi
||gi ||2

is the component of inter-user interference. To

effectively replace the victim in the selected user group, the attacker fabricates a channel
with a larger effective channel gain but a smaller interference component. Specifically, the
vP
−1
hv gi∗ gi
channel feedback can be fabricated as ha = αgv +
ωi ||g
2 , where α and ωi are coefficients
i ||
i=1

with |α| > 1 and |ωi | < 1. Then, the effective channel of the fabricated feedback is now
aligned with the victim’s. They cannot be selected together because of the severe interuser interference. As the fabricated feedback maintains a larger effective channel gain but a
smaller interference component, the attacker will very likely replace the victim in the select
group.
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3.4.2 Cooperative Privilege Escalation (CPE)
In CPE, the malicious user attempts to manipulate the selection results to assist a particular user (i.e., a conspirator) to gain a higher possibility of being selected, achieving the
exclusive access to the resources at the base station.

3.4.2.1

Attack Overview

Assume the conspirator is denoted as sc . The malicious user aims to escalate its privilege,
increasing the possibility of being selected. Intuitively, the conspirator can directly launch
the TDoS to gain the exclusive service by fabricating a forged CSI feedback hc 0 . However,
even if the conspirator successfully gets selected, it can hardly decode the message due to
the inconsistence between the forged reported CSI and its genuine channel.

3.4.2.2

Attack Design

We develop a strategy that significantly increases the possibility of the conspirator accessing the service but does not require any modification on the conspirator’s CSI feedback.
Specifically, the malicious user is involved to help the conspirator. First, we apply the spatial
compatibility quantization over the select group to find out effective channel of each selected
user and get a ranked group S0 . Second, following the reverse order in S0 , we compare the
conspirator with each selected user according to their orthogonal and interference components, and find the possible victim j who can be replaced by the conspirator. Third, the
malicious user launches the TDoS attack to replace the j − 1th selected user. Specifically,
the feedback ha fabricated by the malicious user is orthogonal to the conspirator but significantly interfered with the victim. In this way, when selecting next user, the conspirator will
have an escalated chance to be selected as its effective channel gain now is larger than the
victim’s.
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3.4.3 Network Throughput Degradation (NTD)
The objective of a user selection algorithm is to select a user group that can achieve the
maximum network throughout gain. Nevertheless, we demonstrate that a malicious user can
substantially degrade the network throughput.

3.4.3.1

Attack Overview

In NTD, the malicious user attempts to fabricate a CSI feedback to subvert the selection
results, diminishing the effective network throughput of the selected group. Intuitively, the
overall resources (e.g., bandwidth, number of users served, power) at the base station are
fixed, the attacker can fabricate a CSI feedback to acquire as many resources as possible,
such that the legitimate users can only obtain limited resources, yielding a lower effective
network throughput. Here, we define the effective network throughput as the achievable
sum rate of all selected legitimated users. The malicious user degrades the throughput from
two perspectives: 1) decreasing the effective channel gain of selected users, 2) increasing the
inter-user interference among selected users.

3.4.3.2

Attack Design

The attack is composed of two parts: 1) Explicit throughput degradation: The malicious
user takes advantage of the TDoS attack to replace the user with the maximum effective
channel gain in the predicted group, directly degrading the effective network throughput.
2) Implicit throughput degradation: The malicious user deliberately crafts a CSI feedback
that interferes with users in the predicted group, such that these users are replaced by other
tendentious users to degrade overall network throughput.

3.5

Experimental Evaluation
We build a real-world 4×18 MU-MIMO system and implement multiple typical user

selection algorithms to evaluate the proposed attack strategies.
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3.5.1 Experiment Setup
The system is built on top of the universal software radio peripheral (USRP) following
WiFi 6 standard [96]. USRP is a software defined radio device capable of implementing
different MAC-layer and physical layer designs. The base station is built with four USRPs
synchronized via an external clock OctoClock-G, which can distribute a high-accurate time
scale and clock reference. The clients are standalone USRPs. Figure 3.5 exhibits the floor
plan of the experiment. The base station is located at position 0 and the clients are located
at position 1∼18. Without loss of generality, the one at position 6 is malicious.
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Figure 3.5: Floor plan.

3.5.2 User Selection Algorithms
Table 3.1 lists user selection algorithms implemented in the system. We compare the
performance of these algorithms via the achievable network throughput. In particular, we
repeat each algorithm for 1000 times and measure their network throughput (all results are
normalized by the throughput of optimal user selection). Figure 3.6 box-plots the distribution
of their throughput. As shown, SIEVE, CGUS, FNSUS and MUSE have the comparable
performance and can achieve 72% ∼ 83% of the optimal throughput on average, while RRUS
has the worst performance, resulting in more than 55% throughput degradation on average.
When fairness scheduling is enforced, both CGUS and FNSUS suffer throughout loss in
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return for fairness. The results indicate that CSI based user selection algorithms indeed
improve the network throughput in MU-MIMO networks.
Table 3.1: User selection algorithms in MU-MIMO network.
#
1
2
3

Algorithm
OUS
RRUS
CGUS

4

FNSUS

5

SIEVE

6

MUSE

Normalized throughput

1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0

Description
Brute-force search.
Each user is equally selected in a circular order.
CGUS iteratively selects users as long as the aggregated network throughput improves.
FNSUS iteratively adds new users according to the
defined orthogonality criterion.
SIEVE iteratively refines the candidate set via the
branch-and-bound tree searching.
MUSE identifies the inter-user correlation and select
users with compressed CSI feedback.

RRUS CGUSFNSUSSIEVE MUSPEF-CGPUFS-FNSUS

Figure 3.6: Throughput distribution.

3.5.3 Evaluation of Strategy Inference
We evaluate the proposed strategy inference from both aspects of the prediction accuracy
and computational overhead.

3.5.3.1

Data Collection and Evaluation Metrics

Data collection is done via passive eavesdropping by the malicious user. For each user selection algorithm, we collect 11K pairs of user feedbacks and corresponding selection results,
with 10K pairs for training and 1K pairs for testing.
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In the experiment, we follow the strategy of the MC-grouping to build the deep learning model for each user selection algorithm, and then evaluate its prediction accuracy and
computational overhead. Specifically, we define two metrics for our evaluation: 1) Prediction Accuracy Rate (PAR): PAR is to measure the effectiveness of the proposed strategy
inference. It is defined as PAR =

Number of correct predictions
.
Number of total predictions

2) Prediction Speed Improvement

(PSI): PSI is to measure the prediction efficiency of the proposed strategy inference by comparing it with a brute-force learning model that examines all possible groups. The metric is
defined as PSI =

3.5.3.2

Time overhead of brute−force learning
.
Time overhead of MC −grouping

Prediction Accuracy

We evaluate the prediction accuracy of strategy inference for all CSI based user selection
algorithms listed in Table 3.1. PAR is measured after each epoch (i.e., one cycle through the
full training dataset). The evaluation results are exhibited in Figure 3.7. As shown PARs
for all algorithms can approach a high accuracy around 98.6% after a certain number of
epochs. For example, PAR for CGUS can reach stability after 16 epochs. This observation
indicates that strategy inference can effectively learn different user selection algorithms and
get accurate user selection predictions.
1.0
Algorithm
CGUS
FNSUS
SIEVE
MUSE
PF-CGUS
PF-FNSUS

0.8

PAR

0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0

0

10

20

30

Epoch

40

50

Figure 3.7: PARs of different algorithms.

63

3.5.3.3

Prediction Efficiency

In the evaluation, we use PSI to illustrate the performance improvement of the proposed
strategy over the brute-force learning in various network sizes. As shown in Figure 3.8, the
proposed MC-grouping strategy outperforms the brute-force learning in all different size of
networks. When the network is small (i.e., 3x5, 4x5), the proposed strategy is 1.2 ∼ 2.5
times faster than the brute-force learning. As the computational overhead of the brute-force
learning increases exponentially when the number of users increase, the proposed strategy can
achieve orders of magnitude faster prediction when the network is large. e.g., the prediction of
the proposed strategy is 178 times faster than brute-force learning for CGUS in the 4x18 MUMIMO network. The results demonstrate that the proposed MC-grouping strategy indeed
provides an efficient and salable user selection prediction especially for a large MU-MIMO
network.

200

Algorithm

150

PSI

CGUS
FNSUS
SIEVE

100

MUSE
PF-CGUS
PF-FNSUS

50
1

3x5

3x10 3x18

4x5

Network size

4x10 4x18

Figure 3.8: PSIs for different networks.

3.5.4 Evaluation of User Selection Subversion
We evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed attacks under different user selection algorithms and settings.
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3.5.4.1

Target Denial of Service

For each algorithm, MUSTER first builds a deep learning model to accurately predicts
the selected user group. Then we repeat each algorithm for 1000 times. Every time when the
victim (user 2 or 15) is selected in predicted group, the malicious user becomes active and
launch the TDoS to replace the victim in the group. Otherwise, the malicious user behaves
as a passive eavesdropper.
We define following three metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of the attack: 1) NSorig : It
is defined as the number of times the victim originally been selected among 1000 executions.
For a fair algorithm, each user is selected for 222 (i.e.,

4×1000
)
18

times on average; 2) NSTDoS :

It is defined as the number of times the victim been selected among 1000 executions when
the proposed attack is present. 3) RSsucc : The metric indicates the success rate of the attack
of TDoS. It is defined as RSsucc =

NSorig −NSTDoS
.
NSorig

Table 3.2 illustrates the performance of the TDoS under different scenarios. When TDoS
is not present, all the algorithms can achieve a relatively fair results (i.e. NSorig is raging from
199 to 241). When TDoS is launched, it can achieve a success rate up to 97.48%, essentially
starving the victim. Meanwhile, depending on how fairness scheduling is configured, TDoS
can still cut off more than 60% or 40% of opportunities of the victim been serviced in the
network. It seems fairness scheduling can be applied to resolve the attack of TDoS. Nevertheless, fairness is achieved at the cost of network throughput. A heavily weighed fairness
scheduling will considerably degrade the overall throughput of the MU-MIMO network. It’s
always a trade-off between the fairness and network throughput.

3.5.4.2

Cooperative Privilege Escalation

In the evaluation, we repeat each algorithm for 1000 times. When the conspirator (user
4 or 16) is not selected in the predicted group, the malicious user actively launch the CPE
attack to escalate the conspirator’s possibility of being selected. Similarly, we define four
metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of the attack: 1) Norig : The metric is defined as the
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Table 3.2: Effectiveness of TDoS (θ is the coefficient of proportional fairness, Pos. indicates
the position of the victim.)
Alg.
CGUS
CGUS
FNSUS
FNSUS
SIEVE
SIEVE
MUSE
MUSE
PF-CGUS
PF-CGUS
PF-FNSUS
PF-FNSUS

θ
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
5
1
5

Pos.
2
15
2
15
2
15
2
15
2
2
2
2

NSorig
199
241
237
209
222
231
201
213
215
229
230
228

NSsta
5
8
7
6
7
6
7
8
83
127
81
135

RSsucc
97.48%
96.68%
97.04%
97.12%
96.84%
97.40%
96.51%
96.24%
61.39%
44.54%
64.78%
40.79%

number of times the conspirator originally been selected among 1000 executions; 2) Npri :
The metric is defined as the number of times the conspirator been selected when launching
the attack of CPE; 3) Rsucc : The metric indicates the success rate of the attack. It is defined
as Rsucc =

Npri −Norig
;
1000−Norig

4) PDR: The metric measures the average package delivery rate when

the conspirator has been selected. For an effective CPE, it should not impact the message
decoding at the conspirator.
Table 3.3 illustrates the performance of the CPE under different scenarios. As shown,
the attack of CPE does not impact message decoding at the conspirator (i.e., PDR is always
higher than 97.17%). When CPE is not present, all the algorithms can achieve a relatively
fair results (i.e. Norig is raging from 201 to 243). When CPE is launched, it can achieve more
than 91.16% success rate, essentially escalating the privilege of the conspirator. Meanwhile,
when fairness scheduling is applied, it can achieve a success rate up to 49.35% given different
fairness coefficients. The possible reason is that when a user has been selected in a line,
the corresponding user throughput weighted by the fairness coefficient will be dramatically
reduced, leaving the user even harder to be selected. To alleviate the problem, the conspirator
can change his/her identify (via IP spoofing or MAC spoofing) every time he/she gets served,
such that the weighted throughput will be refreshed and reset to the default value.
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Table 3.3: Effectiveness of CPE.
Alg.
CGUS
CGUS
FNSUS
FNSUS
SIEVE
SIEVE
MUSE
MUSE
PF-CGUS
PF-CGUS
PF-FNSUS
PF-FNSUS

3.5.4.3

θ
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
5
1
5

Pos.
4
16
4
16
4
16
4
16
4
4
4
4

Norig
231
201
241
232
225
229
201
243
226
215
234
213

Npri
932
957
961
953
942
949
943
954
579
321
612
330

Rsucc
91.16%
94.62%
94.86%
93.88%
92.52%
93.38%
92.87%
93.92%
45.61%
13.50%
49.35%
14.87%

PDR
98.34%
99.13%
99.17%
98.13%
98.09%
98.93%
99.01%
97.89%
97.17%
98.23%
97.20%
98.76%

Network Throughput Degradation

In the evaluation, we repeat each algorithm for 1000 times. The malicious user aims to
downgrade the network performance by 1) explicitly replacing a user with the largest effective
channel gain; 2) implicitly user group replacement. To this end, we evaluate the performance
of NTD by comparing three types of network throughput, 1) RZFBF (S), the achievable network throughput of the original predicted group S; 2) RZFBF (S0 , i 6= a), the effective throughput of the manipulated group (i.e., the malicious user is excluded); 3) RZFBF (S, i 6= v ), the
throughput of original group excluding the user with largest channel gain.
Our experiments reveal that NTD can effectively degrade the MU-MIMO network throughput. Figure 3.9 give an example of NTD attack in CGUS. As shown, NTD can leads to a
34.7% ∼ 54.3% network throughput degradation, where about 25% ∼ 40% degradation
comes from the explicitly user replacement while 5% ∼ 18% comes from implicitly group
substitution.

3.6

Countermeasures
Intuitively, we can encrypt the CSI feedback to keep it confidential from malicious users.

However, adopting modern ciphers (e.g., AES) at the physical layer incurs more complexity
and CSI feedback delay that can degrade the MU-MIMO performance [97]. Alternatively,
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Figure 3.9: The attack of NTD in CGUS.
we propose a lightweight yet effective approach, named Reciprocal Consistency Checking, to
protect the user selection in MU-MIMO networks.

3.6.1 Reciprocal Consistency Checking
This approach aims to detect a forged CSI feedback by exploiting channel reciprocity of
downlink and uplink signals. Due to the channel reciprocity, transceivers of the same wireless
link should observe the similar channel. Inspired by the property, we may detect a forged
CSI feedback by checking the consistency between the uplink channel estimated by the base
station and the downlink channel feedback from the user. However, this straightforward
approach may not work due to imbalanced amplitude attenuations and phase rotations in
channels introduced by hardware circuit modules at the base station and users. In particular,
assume the CSI feedback of user i is denoted as hf = [hf 1 , hf 2 , ..., hfN ] and the channel
estimated at the base station is denoted as he = [he1 , he2 , ..., heN ]. Ideally hfn should be
equal to hen (i.e.,

hfn
hen

= 1), but they could be quite different because of the imbalanced

hardware-oriented distortions.
Nevertheless, we observe that the hardware-oriented distortion is identical for channels
estimated at the same device (i.e., hf 1 , ..., hfN experience the same hardware-oriented distortions) [34]. Though
each other, i.e.,

hf 1
he1

=

hfn
hen
hf 2
he2

6= 1, the ratios between any pair of (hfn , hen ) should be equal to
= ... =

hfN
.
heN

Hereby, we develop a lightweight fake CSI detection

scheme by checking the consistency among all the pair ratios of

hfn
hen

for any n ∈ {1, 2, ...N}.
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Specifically, we use the variance δ as the metric to indicate the deviations among ratios of
 
PN hfn  hf  2
hfn
hf
1
,
δ
=
(
−
)
,
where
is the average of all channel ratios between the
n=1 hen
hen
N
he
he
base station and users. When the channel feedback hf is genuine, the deviation of

hfn
hen

only

comes from the channel noise and imperfect time synchronization. δ should be very small.
Meanwhile, when hf is deliberately manipulated to modify the user selection results, the
ratios of

hfn
hen

will not be consistent with each other, resulting in a larger δ.

3.6.2 Experimental Evaluation
We collect 1000 pairs of CSI feedbacks from multiple clients and the corresponding channel estimations at the base station for different scenarios (i.e., attack or non-attack). Let hfi
denote the i th channel feedback and hei denote the corresponding local channel estimation.
 
P
For each pair of hfi and hei , their ratio deviation δ is defined as, δi = 41 4n=1 | hhenfn − hhfe |2 .
Figure 3.10 exhibits the distribution of channel ratio deviations. As shown, when CSI feedback is genuine, δ is very small, more than 90% of deviations are less than 0.05. Meanwhile,
when an attack is present, more than 95% of deviations are larger than 0.1. Particularly, we
can set the empirical threshold τ as 0.06 to determine a fake channel feedback, such that we
can achieve a detection rate of 99.32% while only have a false positive rate of 0.05%.
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CPE
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Figure 3.10: Distribution of δ.

69

3.7

Related Work
Recently, research has been initiated to understand the feasibility and impacts of attacks

leveraging adversarial machine learning in different wireless scenarios, including wireless
signal spoofing [98, 99], spectrum poisoning [89, 100, 101], and smart jamming attacks [102].
Most scenarios considered in these initial studies share a common characteristic: the output
of a decision rule to be learned by the attacker is binary (e.g., spoofing or no spoofing
[100, 103], jamming or no jamming [90]). The binary output makes it relatively simple to
train a machine learning model. Unfortunately, these traditional models cannot be readily
adapted to learn MU-MIMO user selection as its decision rules featuring the number of
outputs grows exponentially when the number of users increases. It is expensive or even
computationally infeasible to enumerate and learn decision boundaries for all possible groups
by directly adopting a common machine learning based classifier. As a result, the user
selection strategy inference in MUSTER integrates RNN and MCTS that can jointly consider
users within possible groups yet substantially reduce the search space. Furthermore, in
contrast to existing studies [104], MUSTER does not rely on adversarial perturbations to
launch attacks because such attacks affects spatial compatibility among multiple users and
lead to undecodable communication.
Our work is also related to research that exploits explicit plaintext CSI feedback. In [36],
the authors present a sniffing attack that allows an attacker to eavesdrop concurrent data
streams of victims by reporting a crafted CSI feedback. A formal mathematical analysis
has been present in [34] to model the CSI-forgery based eavesdropping attacks. The work
in [105] further refines the attack by optimizing the eavesdropping opportunity of attackers.
Those attacks target on compromising the data confidentiality and integrity of MU-MIMO
systems. By contrast, in this work, we develop MUSTER to exploit attacks on subverting
user selection algorithms, compromising both user fairness and system throughput, which
are two key objectives of implementing MU-MIMO networks.
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Chapter 4: Future Work

In this chapter 3 , two future works on securing critical cyber infrastructures and functionalities utilizing machine learning are discussed. Besides these two works, I also plan to
further extend my research to binary code similarity detection [108] and HPC log analytics [109, 110].

4.1

Inferring Sensitive Activities from Encrypted Traffic via Deep Learning
Wireless networks nowadays are ubiquitous in our daily life. In wireless networks, a

transmitter broadcasts wireless signals over the air, and any receiver within the transmitter’s
power coverage is able to receive the signal and decode the data from the signal. Such an
open channel nature makes wireless communication vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks
[111–117]. Once the transmitted data is obtained by an attacker, it can further decode the
message to infer the user’s sensitive activities (e.g., voice or video chatting) or even steal the
user’s private information (e.g., password and personal information), which is carried in the
eavesdropped data.
A simple yet efficient method to prevent such information leakage on wireless communication is to encrypt the transmitted data [113], such that it is difficult for the eavesdropper
to decode useful information. Researchers have proposed multiple encryption schemes to
prevent sensitive information leaked to eavesdroppers [118–125]. However, data encryption
does not stop the attacker from exploring new ways to spy on users. Through traffic analysis [126, 127] on the patterns or statistic results of side-channel information, attackers can
successfully infer a user’s activities on encrypted data [128–135].
3

The preliminary results of this chapter were published in IEEE GlobalSIP 2019 [106] and IEEE DySPAN
2021 [107]. Copyright Permissions are included in Appendix A.
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However, these attacks usually only utilized the statistic results of features from a specific
domain to perform activity inference. Consequently, they can only achieve a relatively high
accuracy of user activity inference in a corresponding domain (e.g., APP usages [128, 131],
spoken phrases [132], motions and behaviors [133, 135]). In this paper, we aim to overcome
this limitation and improve the inference accuracy by proposing a smart spying strategy.
This strategy can infer a user’s activities of multiple domains with a higher accuracy on
the encrypted data. The core idea behind this smart spying strategy is: 1) besides the
statistic results of side-channel information, encoding the encrypted data to improve the
data representativeness; 2) developing a fusion Deep Neural Network (DNN) model which
integrates multiple traditional neural networks to improve the learning abilities. On top of
this strategy, we develop a prototype tool called, SS-Infer (i.e., S mart S pying-Infer), which
can efficiently infer a user’s activities in real-world scenarios.
Specifically, we plan to develop a mechanism to encode the encrypted data. In this way,
our system can capture the characteristics concealed in the data payload, which are ignored
by previous methods. Moreover, we design a classification model that involves multiple
neural networks, and takes the advantage of multiple concatenated hidden layers to achieve
a high classification accuracy. In particular, we first utilize the Convolutional Neural Network
(CNN) to learn the spatial dependency features among the encoded data; and then adopt the
Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) to learn the temporal dependency features on the results
from the first step. Finally, we combine the spatial-temporal features from previous steps
with the flow features directly extracted from network traffic to improve the classification
accuracy. With this proposed architecture, our preliminary evaluation results [106,136] show
that SS-Infer can achieve a classification accuracy rate as high as 99.17% when identifying
a user’s real-world activities.
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4.2

GAN Powered Camouflage Against ML-Based IoT Device Identification
The Internet of Things (IoT) refers to the network of physical devices that are embed-

ded with sensors, chips, operating systems and other technologies, collecting and exchanging
data over Internet [137]. The popularization of universal computer chips and the ubiquity of wireless networks enable the revolution to transform traditional devices into smart
devices as a part of the IoT. These IoT devices can be extensively deployed for different purposes including consumer (e.g., smart home, health care), commerce (e.g., transportation,
manufacturing, agriculture), and military (e.g., battlefield equipment, autonomous reconnaissance). However, the heterogeneity of these devices also imposes security challenges to
the management of IoT networks.
For a network containing different kinds of IoT devices, it is vital to identify the type of
each IoT device before applying fine-graded security policies. Other than managing different
kinds of IoT devices locally by the entity which the devices belong to, knowing the type of
the device can enable a global management for security purpose from the level of the whole
network, in order to permit or prohibit IoT device’s specific behavior. For example, in a
military base, the network should keep the geographical information confidential and forbid
the surveillance camera transferring video data to the outside. Another example is that
an organization may have different permissions for its personnels to access different smart
devices (e.g., the maintenance staff can adjust the air conditioner unit; the security guard
can view the monitor video; and any person should be able to control the smart bubble).
More importantly, IoT device identification can facilitate detecting vulnerable IoT devices
and preventing malicious rogue IoT devices.
Researchers have proposed various methods for IoT device identification. A simple way
is using identifiers (e.g., MAC addresses, IP addresses, Bluetooth ID, Zigbee ID) to identify
IoT devices. However, various identifier spoofing attacks [138, 139] have been exploited to
deceive the identification. It is necessary to develop new methods that can avoid using these
identifiers for IoT device identification. Recent progresses including using statistical features
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which can reflect the behavior of a specific IoT device are developed for identification [140].
However, due to the limitation of mathematical model specific analysis, it is hard for these
methods to keep a steady accuracy rate when applying to different real-world scenarios.
Moreover, these methods usually introduce a high overhead and fail when the traffic is
encrypted.
To overcome these weaknesses, researchers have introduced multiple machine learning
based methods to assist IoT device identification or network traffic fingerprinting [1, 2, 141–
148]. Specifically, these machine learning based methods can successfully identify IoT devices even when the identifier is spoofed, meanwhile they can achieve a high accuracy rate
no matter whether the traffic is encrypted. These methods can be usually formalized as
feature-based machine learning classification problems. k-Nearest Neighbors (k-NN), Support Vector Machine (SVM), Random Forest and Neural Networks are the most frequently
used approaches to build the machine learning model. Through learning on traffic features on
packets (e.g., packet size, header information, even encrypted content in data payload [106]
) or flows (e.g., packet interval, packet count in a time window), these machine learning
models can achieve an accuracy rate as high as 99% in IoT device identification.
Nevertheless, machine learning based IoT device identification methods are designed
with the aim for high performances, but lacks any security guarantee. We discover that
there exists a subtle attack surface that can undermine the machine learning based IoT
device identification. Specifically, these methods rely on learning from the features which
are obtained from network traffics completely or partly controlled by IoT devices. Thus,
a rogue IoT device can maliciously alter its network traffic to evade the machine learning
based identification. In this research, we aim to investigate current machine learning based
IoT device identification methods, reveal the potential attacks, and derive corresponding
countermeasures to protect the IoT device identification from been undermined.
To this end, we plan to develop an attack strategy, named IoTGAN, which can efficiently
disturb the machine learning based IoT device identification. IoTGAN is inspired by Gen-
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erative Adversarial Network (GAN) [149] and it allows rouge IoT devices to manipulate its
traffic to camouflage themselves from been identified. We implement IoTGAN as a practical system to launch this attack. However, IoTGAN can not be simply implemented by
directly using GAN. Two major technical challenges must to be addressed to achieve the
malicious goal of evading IoT device identification: (i) How to obtain the discriminative
model in black-box settings, and (ii) How to add perturbations to IoT traffic through the
manipulative model (i.e., the generative model in GAN) to evade the identification while not
influencing the functionalities of IoT devices.
In addition to the attack strategy design and analysis, we plan to develop an effective
defense approach, named Device Profiling, to protect the machine learning based IoT device
identification from been undermined by IoTGAN. Device Profiling utilizes the raw wireless
signals emitted from IoT devices, which exhibits inherent hardware features and cannot be
manipulated by IoT devices, to mitigate the effect of IoTGAN.
In the preliminary work [107] of this research, we conduct experiments on real-world
IoT devices with different machine learning based identification methods to evaluate the
effectiveness of IoTGAN. The experimental results show that IoTGAN can evade all the
identification methods with a successful rate higher than 90%. We also conduct experiments
to evaluate the defense approach and observe that the attack successful rate significantly
drops to nearly zero after the deployment of Device Profiling.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions

In this dissertation, two machine learning empowered approaches on improving the security of critical cyber infrastructures and functionalities are discussed.
In the first work, we provide a systematic study on effectively defending against adversarial topology inference. We develop a practical system ProTO that adopts a detect-thenobfuscate framework to combat any potential attack. The ProTO system consists of two
major modules: (i) a light-k-NN probing behavior identification mechanism is designed biased towards a very high detection rate and (ii) a topology obfuscation design that proactively
delays all identified probe packets in a way such that the attacker will obtain a structurally
accurate yet fake network topology based on the measurements of these delayed probe packets. We implement the ProTO system and evaluate its performance with various conditions.
Experimental results show that ProTO can (i) achieve a detection rate of 99.9% with a false
alarm of 3%, (ii) effectively disrupt adversarial topology inference by reducing the similarity
score between the real and inferred topologies from nearly 1 to around the benchmark score
of 0.6 (that represents the average similarity score between the real network topology and
a randomly generated topology), and (iii) result in an overall network delay degradation of
1.3% - 2.0%.
In the second work, we propose a system, named MUSTER, to systematically study the
potential risks of the user selection in MU-MIMO networks. The MUSTER system consists of
two major modules: (i) strategy inference, which leverages a new neural group-learning strategy named MC-grouping via combining RNN and MCTS to reverse-engineer a user selection
algorithm; (ii) user selection subversion, which proactively fabricates CSI to manipulate user
selection results for disruption. The experiment results indicate that MUSTER can achieve a
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high accuracy rate in user selection prediction and effectively launches the attacks to disrupt
the network performance. We also develop a technique, Reciprocal Consistency Checking
that can defend against aforementioned attacks to secure the user selection in MU-MIMO
networks. Our experiment shows that the proposed Reciprocal Consistency Checking can
achieve a detection rate of 99.32%, essentially eliminating the potential attacks.
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